Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Richard Chisik
Author-X-Name-First: Richard
Author-X-Name-Last: Chisik
Author-Email: rchisik@economics.ryerson.ca 
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada
Author-Name: Robert J. Lemke
Author-X-Name-First: Robert   
Author-X-Name-Last: Lemke
Author-Email: lemke@lakeforest.edu
Author-Workplace-Name:  Department of Economics, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, Illiniois
Title: When Winning is the Only Thing:  Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in a Three-Candidate Spatial Voting Model
Abstract: It is well-known that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in the standard
three-candidate spatial voting model when candidates maximize their share of the vote. When all
that matters to the candidates is winning the election, however, we show that PSNE do exist. We
provide a complete characterization of such equilibria and then extend our results to elections
with an arbitrary number of candidates. Finally, when two candidates face the potential entrant of
a third, we show that PSNE no longer exist, however, they do exist when the number of existing
candidates is at least three.
Classification-JEL: C7, D0, H8, R1
Keywords: Voting, spatial equilibrium, location models, entry.
Length: 19 pages
Creation-Date: 2010-08
Number: 021
File-URL: http://economics.ryerson.ca/workingpapers/wp021.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp021