Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Haomiao Yu
Author-X-Name-First: Haomiao
Author-X-Name-Last: Yu
Author-Email: hyu@arts.ryerson.ca 
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada
Title: Point-Rationalizability in Large Games
Abstract: In this paper, I characterize point-rationalizability in large non-anonymous games
with three dierent formulations of societal responses, and also propose an implicit dynamic
process that is informed by Guesnerie's eductive notions. Given the introspection and 'mentalizing'
that the point-rationalizability notions presuppose, a motivation behind the work
is to examine their viability in situations where the terms rationality and full information
can be given a more parsimonious, and thereby more analytically viable, expression.
Classification-JEL: C62, C72, D50, D80.
Keywords: Large games, Nash equilibria, point-rationalizability, closed under rational behavior
(curb), societal response, distribution, integration, transformed statistics.
Creation-Date: 2012-08
Number: 030
File-URL: http://economics.ryerson.ca/workingpapers/wp030.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp030