Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: M. Ali Khan
Author-X-Name-First: M. Ali
Author-X-Name-Last: Khan
Author-Email: 
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University
Author-Name: Kali P. Rath
Author-X-Name-First: Kali
Author-X-Name-Last: Rath
Author-Email:  
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame
Author-Name: Yeneng Sun
Author-X-Name-First: Yeneng
Author-X-Name-Last: Sun
Author-Email: matsuny@nus.edu.sg 
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, National University of Singapore 
Author-Name: Haomiao Yu
Author-X-Name-First: Haomiao
Author-X-Name-Last: Yu
Author-Email: hyu@arts.ryerson.ca 
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Ryerson University
Title: Large Games with a Bio-Social Typology
Abstract:  We present a  comprehensive theory of large games in which players have names and determinate social-types and/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for player's names.   In a sufficiently general  context of traits and actions, we address this dissonance by showing a saturated probability space as being a  necessary and sufficient name-space for the existence and upper  hemi-continuity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games with traits. We illustrate the idealized results by  corresponding asymptotic results for  an increasing  sequence of  finite games.
Classification-JEL: C62, D50, D82, G13
Keywords: Large games, social-type, traits, idealized limit game, saturated probability space, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, closed-graph property, upper hemi-continuity, asymptotic implementation
Creation-Date: 2012-10
Number: 035
File-URL: http://economics.ryerson.ca/workingpapers/wp035.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp035