Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Paul Missios
Author-X-Name-First: Paul
Author-X-Name-Last: Missios
Author-Email: pmissios@economics.ryerson.ca 
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada

Title: Wildlife Trade and Endangered Species Protection
Abstract: Markets for endangered species potentially generate incentives for both legal supply and
poaching. To deter poaching, governments can spend on enforcement or increase legal
harvesting to reduce the return from poaching. A leader-follower commitment game is developed
to examine these choices in the presence of illegal harvesting and the resulting impacts on
species stocks. In addition, current trade restrictions imposed under CITES are examined. With
Cournot conjectures among poachers, the model details the subgame perfect equilibrium
interactions between poaching levels, enforcement and legal harvesting.

Classification-JEL: Q2, F13, Q28, C72
Keywords: wildlife trade, endangered species, enforcement, deterrence, limited entry
Length: 21 pages
Creation-Date: 2013-10
Number: 056
File-URL: http://economics.ryerson.ca/workingpapers/wp056.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp056