Demographics in Dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin Models: Overlapping Generations versus Infinitely Lived Consumers*

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ABSTRACT

This paper contrasts the properties of dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models with overlapping generations with those of models with infinitely lived consumers. In both environments, if capital is mobile across countries, factor price equalization occurs after the initial period. In general, however, the properties of equilibria differ drastically across environments: With infinitely lived consumers, we find that factor prices equalize in any steady state or cycle and that, in general, there is positive trade in any steady state or cycle. With overlapping generations, in contrast, we construct examples with steady states and cycles in which factor prices are not equalized, and we find that any equilibrium that converges to a steady state or cycle with factor price equalization has no trade after a finite number of periods.

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1. Introduction

This paper studies the properties of dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models — combinations of static Heckscher-Ohlin trade models and two-sector growth models — with two different demographic environments, an infinitely lived consumer environment and an overlapping generations environment. In the model, a finite number of countries that differ only in population sizes and initial endowments of capital interact with each other by exchanging two traded goods, which are produced using capital and labor. The traded goods are used either in consumption or in the production of a nontraded investment good. Consumers supply labor inelastically and choose levels of consumption and capital accumulation to maximize their lifetime utility.

We find that the equilibrium properties of the model depend crucially on the assumptions made on international capital markets and on the choice of demographic environment. If international borrowing and lending are permitted, factor prices equalize after the first period, independently of the environment. Furthermore, the levels of capital and of international borrowing are not determined in equilibrium. At any given point in the equilibrium path, there is a continuum of possible continuation paths that have all the same prices and aggregate variables, but differ in the distribution of capital and international borrowing across countries and in the pattern of production and trade.

If international borrowing and lending are not permitted, then the equilibrium properties vary depending on the demographic environment. In the infinitely lived consumer environment, if a nontrivial steady state exists, there is a continuum of nontrivial steady states, indexed by the distribution of capital across countries. To which steady state the world economy converges depends on initial endowments of capital. Factor prices equalize in all steady states and trade is positive in all steady states except the one where capital-labor ratios are equal across countries. In the overlapping generations environment, any nontrivial steady state with factor price equalization is autarkic and has no trade. Furthermore, we show using examples that factor price equalization does not need to occur in steady state. Both environments also differ in the behavior of equilibrium paths that converge to a steady state. In the overlapping generations environment, any equilibrium converging to a steady state where factor prices equalize becomes autarkic in a finite number of periods. No corresponding result exists for the infinitely lived consumer environment.

As in two-sector closed economy models, equilibrium paths may exhibit cycles and chaotic behavior. In the infinitely lived consumer environment, we show that factor prices equalize in any
equilibrium cycle. In the overlapping generations environment, we show using examples that there may exist equilibrium cycles in which factor prices are not equalized. The paper develops a methodology for constructing two-country, two-sector overlapping generations models from closed one- and two-sector economies in such a way that preserves their properties in terms of multiplicity of equilibria or cyclical behavior.

The literature on dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models was pioneered by Oniki and Uzawa (1965), Bardhan (1965), Stiglitz (1970), and Deardorff and Hanson (1978). In their models, countries produce two traded goods, a consumption good and an investment good, using production functions that differ across sectors but not across countries. In addition to differences in endowments, these papers also assume that countries have different savings rates or rates of time preference, so that the steady state is determined independently of initial conditions. Their assumptions prevent factor prices from equalizing in the steady state. Our model differs from theirs in two crucial aspects: we consider utility-maximizing consumers and we do not impose any modeling assumptions restricting the equilibrium behavior of factor prices. Baxter (1992) studies the long-run behavior of a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model where countries differ in tax policy and shows how changes in tax policy may lead to reversals in comparative advantage. Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2004a) calibrate a specific dynamic trade model and study issues of convergence in income levels across countries under the assumption that factor prices do not equalize over time.

In contrast to the previous studies, more recent papers in the literature impose, by assumption or by the choice of production functions, factor price equalization along the equilibrium path. Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2004b) introduce technology shocks and study the business cycle properties of a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model under the assumption of factor price equalization. Chen (1992) studies the equilibrium properties of a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model with elastic labor supply under the assumption that factor prices equalize along the equilibrium path. Ventura (1997) adds additional structure to the model that guarantees that factor prices equalize in equilibrium, independently of initial conditions, and that rules out the possibility of cyclical and chaotic behavior. He derives results regarding convergence of income distribution across countries over time. Bajona and Kehoe (2006) study the properties of a generalized version of Ventura’s model without imposing factor price equalization. They show that the convergence results of Ventura (1997) depend crucially on the factor price equalization assumption.

The literature on dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models in an overlapping generations environment is less abundant. Galor (1992) characterizes the dynamics of a two-sector, two-period-lived overlapping generations model of growth in a closed economy. Two-country models of trade with an overlapping generations environment assume some difference across countries besides factor endowments. For example, Bianconi (1995) assumes differences in tax rates across countries; Galor and Lin (1997) and Mountford (1998) assume that countries differ in their rates of time preference; Sayan (2005) assumes differences in population growth rates. All these papers study the long-run properties of the model under the factor price equalization assumption. Papers that study the two-sector overlapping generations environment under the small open economy assumption include Serra (1991), Gokcekus and Tower (1998), Kemp and Wong (1995), and Fisher (1992).


2. The model

There are $n$ countries in the model, which differ in their population sizes and their initial endowments of capital. Each country can produce three goods: two traded goods — a capital intensive good and a labor intensive good — and a nontraded investment good. The technologies available to produce these goods are the same across countries. Each traded good $j$, $j=1,2$, is produced using capital and labor according to the production function

$$ y_j = \phi_j(k_j, \ell_j) $$

(A.1) The functions $\phi_j$ are increasing, concave, continuously differentiable, and homogeneous of degree one.
We assume that $\phi_j$ is continuously differentiable to simplify the exposition, and we let additional subscripts — $\phi_{jk}(k_j, \ell_j), \phi_{jk}(k_j, \ell_j)$ — denote partial derivatives. It is an open question whether any substantive conclusion depends on this assumption. In particular, our analysis is easily extended to the fixed coefficient production functions, $y_j = \min[k_j / a_{jk}, \ell_j / a_{jk}]$.

Producers minimize costs taking prices as given and earn zero profits:

$$r \geq p_j \phi_{jk}(k_j, \ell_j), \quad \text{if } k_j > 0$$

$$w \geq p_j \phi_{jk}(k_j, \ell_j), \quad \text{if } \ell_j > 0$$

for $j = 1, 2$. Here $r$ is the rental rate, $w$ is the wage, and $p_1$ and $p_2$ are the prices of the traded goods.

A.2. Good 1 is relatively capital intensive and there is no capital intensity reversal. That is,

$$\frac{\phi_{1k}(k / \ell, 1)}{\phi_{1k}(k / \ell, 1)} < \frac{\phi_{2k}(k / \ell, 1)}{\phi_{2k}(k / \ell, 1)} \quad \text{for all } k / \ell > 0. \quad (4)$$

This condition and the concavity of $\phi_1$ and $\phi_2$ imply that for any wage-rental ratio $w/r$, the profit maximizing capital-labor ratios satisfy

$$\frac{k_1}{\ell_1} > \frac{k_2}{\ell_2}. \quad (5)$$

Notice that, if the production functions $\phi_j$, $j = 1, 2$, display constant elasticities of substitution, assumption A.2 implies that both production functions have the same elasticity of substitution.

The investment good is produced using the two traded goods:

$$x = f(x_1, x_2). \quad (6)$$

A.3. The function $f$ is increasing, concave, continuously differentiable, and homogeneous of degree one. Capital depreciates at the rate $\delta$, $1 \geq \delta > 0$.

The first-order conditions for profit maximization are

$$p_i \geq qf_i(x_1, x_2), \quad \text{if } x_i > 0 \quad (7)$$
\[ p_2 \geq qf_2(x_1, x_2), \quad \text{if } x_2 > 0, \]  

(8)

where \( q \) is the price of the investment good.

**A.4.** Labor and capital are not mobile across countries, but are mobile across sectors within a country.

**2.1. Infinitely lived consumers**

In the environment with infinitely lived consumer-workers, each country \( i, \ i = 1, \ldots, n \), has a continuum of measure \( L_i' \) of consumers, each of whom is endowed with \( k_0^i > 0 \) units of capital in period 0 and one unit of labor at every period, which is supplied inelastically. Consumers have the same utility functions, within countries and across countries. In each period, the representative consumer in country \( i \) decides how much to consume of each of the two traded goods in the economy, \( c_{1i}^i, \ c_{2i}^i \), how much capital to accumulate for the next period, \( k_{t+1}^i \), and how much to lend, \( b_{t+1}^i \). Consumers derive their income from wages, \( w_i \), returns to capital, \( r_i \), and returns to lending, \( r_i^{ln} \). The representative consumer in country \( i \) solves the problem

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{max} & \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i u(c_{1i}^i, c_{2i}^i) \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad p_i c_{1i}^i + p_{2i} c_{2i}^i + q_i^i x_{1i}^i + b_{t+1}^i \leq w_i^i + r_i^i k_{t+1}^i + (1 + r_i^{bi})b_t^i \\
& \quad k_{t+1}^i - (1 - \delta)k_t^i \leq x_t^i \\
& \quad c_{ji}^i \geq 0, \ x_t^i \geq 0, \ b_t^i \geq -B \\
& \quad k_0^i \leq \bar{k}_0, \ b_0^i \leq 0. 
\end{align*}
\]

(9)

Here \( B \) is a positive number large enough so that the constraint \( b_t^i \geq -B \) rules out Ponzi schemes but does not otherwise bind in equilibrium.

**A.5.** The period utility function \( u(c_1, c_2) \) is homothetic, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously differentiable, with \( \lim_{c_j \to 0} u_j(c_1, c_2) = \infty \), and \( \lim_{c_j \to \infty} u_j(c_1, c_2) = 0 \).

The first-order conditions of this consumer’s problem (9) imply that
Furthermore, the returns to capital and to international bonds, if permitted, have to be the same:

\[ 1 + r_{+1}^i \geq \frac{q_{+1}^i (1 - \delta) + r_{+1}^i}{q_i^i}, \quad \text{if } x_i^i > 0. \] (12)

The feasibility conditions for each traded good \( j \), \( j = 1, 2 \), in period \( t \), \( t = 0,1,\ldots \), is

\[ \sum_{j=1}^n L(j^i + x_j^i) = \sum_{j=1}^n L y_j^i. \] (13)

Here \( y_j^i \) and \( x_j^i \) denote, respectively, the output and input into investment of traded good \( j \) in country \( i \), both expressed in per worker terms. Notice that, because each consumer-worker is endowed with one unit of labor in every period, these quantities are also the same quantities per unit of labor. It is easy to modify the model, as does Ventura (1997), so that the endowment of labor per worker differs across countries, as long as these differences remain constant over time.

The feasibility conditions for factors and for the investment good are

\[ k_{+1}^i + k_{+2}^i \leq k_i \] (14)

\[ \ell_{+1}^i + \ell_{+2}^i \leq 1 \] (15)

\[ k_{+1}^i - (1 - \delta)k_i \leq x_i^i. \] (16)

The market clearing condition for international bonds is

\[ \sum_{i=1}^n L^i b_i^i = 0 \] (17)

when international borrowing and lending are permitted. If not, this condition becomes \( b_i^i = 0 \).

2.2. Overlapping generations

In the environment with overlapping generations, a new generation of consumer-workers is born in each period in each country. Consumers in generation \( t \), \( t = 0,1,\ldots \) are born in period \( t \) and
live for \( m \) periods. Each of these generations in country \( i \) has a continuum of measure \( L'^i \) of consumers. In period of life \( h, h = 1, \ldots, m \), each consumer is endowed with \( \overline{e}^h \) units of labor, which are supplied inelastically. Consumers can save through accumulation of capital and bonds. We assume that they are born without any initial endowment of capital or bonds. The representative consumer born in country \( i \) in period \( t, t = 0, 1, \ldots \), solves

\[
\max \sum_{h=1}^{m} \beta_t^h u_t(c_{1+h,1}^t, c_{2+h,1}^t)
\]

\[
\text{s.t. } p_{1+h,1}^t c_{1+h,1}^t + p_{2+h,1}^t c_{2+h,1}^t + q_{1+h,1}^t x_{1+h,1}^t + b_{1+h}^t \leq w_{1+h}^t \overline{e}^h + r_{1+h,1}^t k_{1+h,1}^t + (1 + r_{1+h,1}^t) b_{1+h,1}^t \tag{18}
\]

\[
k_{t+h}^t - (1-\delta)k_{t+h-1}^t \leq x_{t+h-1}^t
\]

\[
c_{j+h,1}^t \geq 0, \quad x_{t+h-1}^t \geq 0
\]

\[
k_t^t \leq 0, \quad b_t^t \leq 0, \quad x_{t+m-1}^t \geq -(1-\delta)k_{t+m-1}^t, \quad b_{t+m}^t \geq 0
\]

where \( u_t \) is the utility function in period of life \( h \) and satisfies the analogue of assumption A.5:

**A.5'.** For every \( h, \ h = 1, \ldots, m \), the utility function \( u_t(c_1^h, c_2^h) \) is homothetic, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously differentiable, with \( \lim_{c_1 \to 0} u_t(c_1, c_2) = \infty \) and \( \lim_{c_1 \to \infty} u_t(c_1, c_2) = 0 \).

In addition, there are \( m-1 \) generations of initial old consumers alive in period 0. Each generation \( s, \ s = -m+1, \ldots, -1 \), in country \( i \) has a continuum of measure \( L'^i \) of consumers, each of whom lives for \( m+s \) periods and is endowed with \( \overline{e}^{h-s} \) units of labor in period \( h, h = 1, \ldots, m+s \). Each initial old consumer is also endowed with capital \( \overline{k}_0^t \) and bonds \( \overline{b}_0^t \). The representative consumer of generation \( t, t = -m+1, \ldots, -1 \), in country \( i \) solves

\[
\max \sum_{h=1}^{m} \beta_t^h u_t(c_{1+h,1}^t, c_{2+h,1}^t)
\]

\[
\text{s.t. } p_{1+h,1}^t c_{1+h,1}^t + p_{2+h,1}^t c_{2+h,1}^t + q_{1+h,1}^t x_{1+h,1}^t + b_{1+h}^t \leq w_{1+h}^t \overline{e}^h + (1 + r_{1+h,1}^t) b_{1+h,1}^t + r_{1+h,1}^t k_{1+h,1}^t \tag{19}
\]

\[
k_{t+h}^t - (1-\delta)k_{t+h-1}^t \leq x_{t+h-1}^t
\]

\[
c_{j+h,1}^t \geq 0, \quad x_{t+h-1}^t \geq 0
\]

\[
k_t^t \leq \overline{k}_0^t, \quad b_t^t \leq \overline{b}_0^t, \quad x_{t+m-1}^t \geq -(1-\delta)k_{t+m-1}^t, \quad b_{t+m}^t \geq 0
\]
Notice that in each country $i$ and each period $t$, the total population is $mL^t$ and — normalizing the total supply of labor per period to be 1, $\sum_{h=1}^{m} \bar{L}^h = 1$ — the total amount of labor is $L^t$.

The feasibility condition for traded good $j$, $j = 1, 2$, in period $t$, $t = 0, 1, \ldots$, is

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i \left( \sum_{h=1}^{m} e_j u_{ijh+1} + x_j^i \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i y_j^i. \quad (20)$$

Notice that, in this notation, $y_j^i$ and $x_j^i$ are expressed in terms of per unit of labor, not in terms of per capita. The output per capita of traded good $j$ in country $i$ in period $t$ is $y_j^i / m$, for example.

The feasibility conditions for factor inputs and for the investment good are the same as in the infinitely lived consumer environment, and are given by equations (14), (15), and (16).

Given intergenerational heterogeneity, we need to impose additional feasibility conditions in the overlapping generations environment:

$$x_i^i = \sum_{h=1}^{m-1} x_i^{i-h+1} \quad (21)$$

$$k_i^i = \sum_{h=2}^{m} k_i^{i-h+1}. \quad (22)$$

We also need to impose a market clearing condition on bonds. If international borrowing and lending are permitted, then $r_i^{bi} = r_i^{bi}$ and this condition is

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i \sum_{h=2}^{m} b_i^{i-h+1} = \left( \prod_{s=0}^{t} (1 + r_i^{si}) \right) \sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i \sum_{h=1-m}^{s} \bar{b}_0^{ih}. \quad (23)$$

If the initial nominal assets satisfy

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i \sum_{h=1-m}^{s} \bar{b}_0^{ih} \neq 0, \quad (24)$$

then the world has fiat money. If, however,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i \sum_{h=1-m}^{s} \bar{b}_0^{ih} = 0, \quad (25)$$

then the world does not have fiat money.

If international borrowing and lending are not permitted, then the market clearing condition on bonds within each country becomes

$$\sum_{h=2}^{m} b_i^{i-h+1} = \left( \prod_{s=0}^{t} (1 + r_i^{hi}) \right) \sum_{h=1-m}^{s} \bar{b}_0^{ih}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n. \quad (26)$$
If
\[ \sum_{h=1}^{1-m} \bar{F}_h^i \neq 0, \]  
then country \( i \) has fiat money, and if
\[ \sum_{h=1}^{1-m} \bar{F}_h^i = 0, \]
then country \( i \) does not have fiat money.

3. Equilibrium

We give unified definitions of equilibrium and of steady states for Heckscher-Ohlin models with infinitely lived consumers and with overlapping generations.

**Definition 1.** There are \( n \) countries of different sizes, \( L^i, i = 1, \ldots, n \), and different initial endowments of capital and bonds: \( \bar{K}_0^i \) and \( \bar{B}_0^i \), \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), in the environment with infinitely lived consumers and \( \bar{K}_0^u \) and \( \bar{B}_0^u \), \( s = -m + 1, \ldots, -1, \ i = 1, \ldots, n \), in the environment with overlapping generations. An equilibrium is sequences of consumptions, investments, capital stocks, and bond holdings, \( \{c_i^t, c_2^t, x_i^t, k_i^t, b_i^t\} \) in the environment with infinitely lived consumers and \( \{c_i^{ts}, c_2^{ts}, x_i^{ts}, k_i^{ts}, b_i^{ts}\} \), \( s = t - m + 1, \ldots, t \), in the environment with overlapping generations, output and inputs for each traded industry, \( \{y_j^t, k_j^t, l_j^t\} \), \( j = 1, 2 \), output and inputs for the investment sector \( \{x_i^t, x_{1i}^t, x_{2i}^t\} \), and prices \( \{p_{tu}, p_{2u}, q_{t}^i, w_{t}, r_{t}^i, r_{t}^{hi}\} \), \( i = 1, \ldots, n, t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots \), such that

1. Given prices \( \{p_{tu}, p_{2u}, q_{t}^i, w_{t}, r_{t}^i, r_{t}^{hi}\} \), the consumption and accumulation plan \( \{c_1^t, c_2^t, x_i^t, k_i^t, b_i^t\} \) solves the consumers’ problem (9) in the environment with infinitely lived consumers, and the consumption and accumulation plan \( \{c_i^{ts}, c_2^{ts}, x_i^{ts}, k_i^{ts}, b_i^{ts}\} \) solves the consumers’ problems (18) and (19) in the environment with overlapping generations.

2. Given prices \( \{p_{tu}, p_{2u}, q_{t}^i, w_{t}, r_{t}^i, r_{t}^{hi}\} \), the production plans \( \{y_j^t, k_j^t, l_j^t\} \) and \( \{x_i^t, x_{1i}^t, x_{2i}^t\} \) satisfy the cost minimization and zero profit conditions (2), (3), (7), and (8).

3. The consumption, capital stock, \( \{c_1^t, c_2^t, x_i^t, k_i^t, b_i^t\} \) or \( \{c_i^{ts}, c_2^{ts}, x_i^{ts}, k_i^{ts}, b_i^{ts}\} \), and production plans, \( \{y_j^t, k_j^t, l_j^t\} \) and \( \{x_i^t, x_{1i}^t, x_{2i}^t\} \), satisfy the feasibility conditions (1), (6) and (13)–(17) in the
Definition 2. A steady state is consumption levels, an investment level, a capital stock, and bond holdings, \((\hat{c}_1, \hat{c}_2, \hat{\bar{x}}, \hat{k}, \hat{b})\) in the environment with infinitely lived consumers and
\((\hat{c}_1^{is}, \hat{c}_2^{is}, \hat{x}^{is}, \hat{k}^{is}, \hat{b}^{is})\), \(s = 1, \ldots, m\), in the environment with overlapping generations, output and inputs for each traded industry, \((\hat{y}_j, \hat{l}_j)\), \(j = 1, 2\), output and inputs for the investment sector,
\((\hat{x}_i, \hat{\bar{x}}_i, \hat{x}_2)\), and prices, \((\hat{p}_1, \hat{p}_2, \hat{q}, \hat{\bar{w}}, \hat{r}, \hat{r}^{bi})\), \(i = 1, \ldots, n\), that satisfy the conditions of a competitive equilibrium for appropriate initial endowments of capital and bonds, \(\overline{k}_0 = \hat{k}, \overline{b}_0 = \hat{b}\) in the environment with infinitely lived consumers and \(\overline{k}_0^{is} = \hat{k}^{is}\) and \(\overline{b}_0^{is} = \hat{b}^{is}\) in the environment with overlapping generations. Here we set \(\nu_t = \hat{\nu}\) for all \(t\), where \(\nu\) represents a generic variable.

Definition 3. An equilibrium displays sustainable growth if there exists a constant \(1 < \gamma < \infty\) such that 
\[
\liminf_{t \to \infty} \frac{k_{t+1}^i}{k_t^i} = \liminf_{t \to \infty} \frac{c_{t+1}^i}{c_t^i} = \gamma, \ i = 1, \ldots, n.
\]

We will often assume that the initial conditions are such that all countries produce a positive amount of the investment good in every period, \(x_t^i > 0\), and we normalize \(q_t^i = q_t = 1\) for all \(t\). We make two remarks regarding this assumption: First, since the investment good is produced using the two traded goods, and these prices are equalized across countries by trade, even if a country does not produce the investment good in a given period, the price of the investment good is the same as in countries that produce the investment good. Second, in the examples presented in this paper, we assume complete depreciation, \(\delta = 1\), and the assumption of positive investment becomes an assumption of positive capital, \(x_t^i = k_t^i > 0\). Positive capital in all countries in every period can be ensured by assuming Inada conditions on the production functions \(\phi_i\). Bajona and Kehoe (2006) construct an example where there are corner solutions in investment and in capital in a model where production functions do not satisfy Inada conditions.

The characterization and computation of equilibrium of the models described above is difficult in general because it involves determining the pattern of specialization in production over an infinite horizon. In particular, for any prices of the traded goods, \(p_{1t}, p_{2t}\), there exists threshold
values $\kappa_1(p_{2t}/p_u)\) and $\kappa_2(p_{2t}/p_u)$ such that a country produces positive amounts of both traded goods if and only if its capital-labor ratio $k^i_t$ satisfies

$$\kappa_1(p_{2t}/p_u) > k^i_t > \kappa_2(p_{2t}/p_u).$$

(29)

The set of capital-labor ratios that satisfy weak versions of these inequalities is called the cone of diversification. Figure 1, known as the Lerner diagram, depicts the cone of diversification graphically. Any two countries with endowments in the cone of diversification use capital and labor in the same proportions and face the same factor prices, $r_i$ and $w_i$. If the assumption of no factor intensity reversals, A.2, is violated, there can be more than one cone of diversification and more than one pair of factor prices compatible with production of both goods in equilibrium.

If all countries have endowments in the cone of diversification at some prices of the traded goods, we say that factor price equalization occurs at those prices. This result is the factor price equalization theorem of static Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Notice that, given the endowments of capital and labor in each country in each period, the production of traded goods is identical to that in a static, two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model. Consequently, the Rybszynski theorem and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem also hold in our model.

To prove a version of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem for this model — that, in any period, a country exports the good that is intensive in the factor in which it is abundant — we would need to make assumptions to ensure that trade is balanced for each country and that expenditures on the two traded goods are proportional across countries. In the next section, we assume that there is no international borrowing and lending, which ensures that trade is balanced for each country. Assumption A.3 ensures that $12 / _{ii} x$ is equal across countries. In the infinitely lived consumer environment, assumption A.5 ensures that $c^i_t / c^i_{2t}$ is equal across countries, but our assumptions do not impose any restrictions on $(c^i_{1t} + x^i_{1t})/(c^i_{2t} + x^i_{2t})$. If we assume that $u(c_1, c_2) = v(f(c_1, c_2))$, where $v$ is strictly concave and increasing, then we know that $c^i_{1t} / c^i_{2t} = x^i_{1t} / x^i_{2t}$, which implies that $(c^i_{1t} + x^i_{1t})/(c^i_{2t} + x^i_{2t})$ is equal across countries and that the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem holds.

Similarly, in the overlapping generations environment, we would need to strengthen assumption A.5' by assuming that $u_h(c_1, c_2) = v_h(f(c_1, c_2))$ for all $h$ to be able prove the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. If we do not make this sort of assumption on the relation between consumption and
investment, there is no reason to expect the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem to hold. It is easy to construct examples in which a capital abundant country exports the labor intensive good.

If factor price equalization occurs in every period, the equilibrium prices and aggregate variables of the model can be determined by solving for the equilibrium of the integrated economy, a closed economy with factor endowments equal to the world endowments of the factors of production. (See Dixit and Norman 1980 for a description of the methodology.) The equilibrium of the \( n \)-country model is then computed by disaggregating the consumption, production, and investment allocations of the integrated economy across countries in a way that is consistent with initial conditions. The integrated economy approach greatly simplifies the characterization of equilibrium in static models. As we will see, it is even more useful in the dynamic models considered in this paper. The question arises of how general is a situation where factor prices are equalized along the equilibrium path. The existing literature abstracts away from this question either by assuming factor price equalization along the equilibrium path — as in Chen 1992, Ventura 1997, and Cuñat and Maffezzoli 2004a — or by not allowing for factor prices to equalize — as in Baxter 1992 and Cuñat and Maffezzoli 2004b. This paper derives general results regarding factor price equalization in long-run equilibria and along equilibrium paths.

4. General model with international borrowing and lending

In this section, we obtain two results for models with both infinitely lived consumers and overlapping generations when international borrowing and lending are permitted: First, factor price equalization occurs after the initial period. Second, the equilibrium patterns of production, trade, capital accumulation, and international borrowing are not determinate. All proofs are in appendix 2.

**Proposition 1:** In both a model with infinitely lived consumers that satisfies A.1–A.5 and a model with overlapping generations that satisfy assumptions A.1–A.4 and A.5', assume that international borrowing and lending are permitted. Also assume that \( x_i^t > 0 \) for all \( i \) and all \( t \). Then factor price equalization occurs for all \( t = 1, 2, \ldots \).

**Proposition 2:** In both a model with infinitely lived consumers that satisfies A.1–A.5 and a model with overlapping generations that satisfy assumptions A.1–A.4 and A.5', assume that international
borrowing and lending are permitted. Also assume that \( x^i_t > 0 \) for all \( i \) and all \( t \). Then countries’ production plans and international trade patterns are not determinate in any period \( t > 0 \).

The intuition for these propositions is the classic result in static Heckscher-Ohlin theory that trade in goods is a substitute for factor mobility. (See, for example, Mundell 1957 and Markusen 1983.) The assumption that \( x^i_t > 0 \) for all \( i \) and all \( t \) is a far stronger assumption than we need to prove proposition 2 as we explain in the proof of the proposition in the appendix.

In the rest of the paper, we study versions of the general model where international borrowing and lending are not permitted.

**A.6.** In the infinitely lived consumer environment, assume that \( b^i_t = 0 \) for all \( t = 0,1,..., i = 1,...,n \).

**A.6’.** In the overlapping generations environment, assume that
\[
\sum_{h=2}^{m} b^{i-h+1}_t = \left( \prod_{s=0}^{t} (1 + r^{i}_{s}) \right) \sum_{h=1-m}^{-1} \delta^{i}_{0-h} \text{ for all } t = 0,1,..., i = 1,...,n .
\]

In addition, we will sometimes assume that consumers aggregate the two traded goods to obtain utility in the same way that firms aggregate these goods to obtain the investment good.

**Definition 4.** A model with infinitely lived consumers that satisfies A.1–A.6 is one-sector aggregatable if \( u(c_1, c_2) = v(f(c_1, c_2)) \) for some \( v \) that is continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and strictly increasing. Similarly, a model with overlapping generations that satisfies A.1–A.4 and A.5’–A.6’ is one-sector aggregatable if \( u_h(c_1, c_2) = v_h(f(c_1, c_2)) \) for some \( v_h, h = 1,...,m \), that satisfy these properties.

As we have seen, this assumption — which is very restrictive — guarantees that trade patterns obey the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. As we shall see, it is also useful in restricting the possible dynamic behavior of equilibria.

5. **Results for economies with infinitely lived consumers**

In this section, we study the behavior of equilibrium paths for the model with infinitely lived consumers. We define a social planner’s problem for country \( i \) and prove that in equilibrium the allocation in each country solves this planner’s problem. In fact, the planner’s problem is that
of a small open economy that takes the sequence of prices of the two traded goods as exogenously
given. We use properties of the value function for this problem to derive results on the evolution of
relative factor abundances along equilibrium paths.

5.1. Country social planner’s problem

In this section, we argue that equilibrium allocations in country \( i \) solve a country planner’s
problem in a one-sector growth model with a time varying production function. We begin by
aggregating consumption of the two traded goods. The homotheticity assumption A.5 implies that
\( u(c_1, c_2) = v(g(c_1, c_2)), \)

where \( g \) is strictly increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree one, and \( v \) is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Define \( c = g(c_1, c_2) \) to be an aggregate
consumption good and \( p(p_1, p_2) \) to be its unit cost function

\[
p(p_1, p_2) = \min p_1 c_1 + p_2 c_2
\]

s.t. \( g(c_1, c_2) \geq 1 \)

\( c_j \geq 0 \).

We next aggregate production of the two traded goods by defining the revenue function

\[
\pi(p_1, p_2, k^i) = \max p_1 \phi_1(k_1^i, \ell_1^i) + p_2 \phi_2(k_2^i, \ell_2^i)
\]

s.t. \( k_1^i + k_2^i \leq k^i \)

\( \ell_1^i + \ell_2^i \leq 1 \)

\( k_j^i \geq 0, \ell_j^i \geq 0 \).

This revenue function indicates, for any given prices of the two traded goods, the maximum
income that a country can obtain by allocating capital and labor over the production of the traded
goods. (See, for example, Dixit and Norman 1980, who refer to this function as the revenue
function; many other authors refer to it as the GDP function.) Figure 2 shows how the revenue
function is constructed. As is seen in the figure, this function is strictly increasing, concave, but
not strictly concave, and continuously differentiable, but not twice continuously differentiable.

Using the first-order conditions for the revenue maximization problem (31), we obtain a
characterization of the relation between factor endowments, factor prices, and production patterns.
We state the following result, which is standard in Heckscher-Ohlin theory, because it is useful in the rest of the paper.

**Lemma 1.** The optimal capital-labor ratios in interior solutions to the revenue maximization problem depend only on relative prices:

\[
\frac{k^i_j}{l^i_j} = \kappa_j \left( \frac{p_2}{p_1} \right), \quad j = 1, 2 \tag{32}
\]

If \( \kappa_1 \left( \frac{p_2}{p_1} \right) \geq k^i \geq \kappa_2 \left( \frac{p_2}{p_1} \right) \), then factor prices only depend on goods prices,

\[
r(p_1, p_2) = p_1 \phi_k \left( \kappa_1 \left( \frac{p_2}{p_1} \right), 1 \right) = p_2 \phi_k \left( \kappa_2 \left( \frac{p_2}{p_1} \right), 1 \right) \tag{33}
\]

\[
w(p_1, p_2) = p_1 \phi_k \left( \kappa_1 \left( \frac{p_2}{p_1} \right), 1 \right) = p_2 \phi_k \left( \kappa_2 \left( \frac{p_2}{p_1} \right), 1 \right). \tag{34}
\]

If \( k^i > \kappa_1 \left( \frac{p_2}{p_1} \right) \), then country \( i \) produces only good 1, \( r^i(p_1, p_2, k^i) = p_1 \phi_k \left( k^i, 1 \right) < r(p_1, p_2) \), and \( w^i(p_1, p_2, k^i) = p_1 \phi_k \left( k^i, 1 \right) > w(p_1, p_2) \). If \( k^i < \kappa_2 \left( \frac{p_2}{p_1} \right) \), then country \( i \) produces only good 2, \( r^i(p_1, p_2, k^i) = p_2 \phi_k \left( k^i, 1 \right) > r(p_1, p_2) \), and \( w^i(p_1, p_2, k^i) = p_2 \phi_k \left( k^i, 1 \right) < w(p_1, p_2) \).

Given a sequence of prices \( p^t = (p_{1t}, p_{2t}, p_{1t+1}, p_{2t+1}, \ldots) \) and an initial endowment of capital \( k^i_0 \), the country social planner takes the sequence of prices as given and solves

\[
V(k^i_0; p^0) = \max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t v(c^i_t)
\]

\[
\text{s.t. } p(p_{1t}, p_{2t})c^i_t + x^i_t \leq \pi(p_{1t}, p_{2t}, k^i_t)
\]

\[
k^i_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k^i_t \leq x^i_t
\]

\[
c^i_t \geq 0, \quad x^i_t \geq 0
\]

\[
k^i_0 \text{ given.}
\]

Notice that this problem is like that of a planner in a one-sector model, except that the analogue of the production function, \( \pi(p_{1t}, p_{2t}, k^i_t) \), changes every period as prices change and consumption is weighted by the price index \( p(p_{1t}, p_{2t}) \).
Lemma 2: In a model with infinitely lived consumers that satisfies A.1–A.6, let the sequence \( \{c^i_t, c^i_t, k^i_t, x^i_t, p_{1t}, P_{2i}\} \) be the equilibrium consumption, investment, and capital stock in country \( i \) and the equilibrium prices for the traded goods. Then, for any equilibrium prices \( p' = ((p_{1t}, p_{2t}), (p_{1t+1}, p_{2t+1}), \ldots) \), the country value function \( V(k; p') \) is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in \( k \) for all \( k > 0 \). Furthermore, for each \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), the sequence \( \{c^i_t, x^i_t, k^i_t\} \), where \( c^i_t = g(c^i_{1t}, c^i_{2t}) \), solves the country planner’s problem (35) in which the prices are the equilibrium prices and the initial capital stock is \( k^0_i \).

Lemma 2 says that the country value function \( V(k; p^0) \) completely summarizes the situation of a country \( i \). We have not imposed conditions on \( \phi_1, \phi_2, f, \) and \( u \) to ensure that an equilibrium of the world economy exists. It may be that the economy is so productive that the representative consumer in some country can attain infinite utility, or it may be that the economy is so unproductive that consumption in some country converges so quickly to zero that the consumer can attain no more than utility minus infinity. What lemma 2 says is that, if an equilibrium exists, \( -\infty < V(k; p^0) < +\infty \), not just for the initial endowments \( k^0_i, i = 1, \ldots, n \), but for all \( k > 0 \), and that \( V(k; p') \) has the characteristics of a dynamic programming value function.

The country social planner’s problem and associated value function \( V(k; p') \) are even closer to those of a planner in a one-sector growth model when the model is one-sector aggregatable. In this case, \( p(p_{1t}, p_{2t}) = 1 \) for any possible \( p_{1t} \) and \( p_{2t} \).

5.2. Relative factor abundance

In this section, we show that countries maintain their relative factor abundance along equilibrium paths. Notice that the \( n \) countries’ social planner’s problems — one for each country — have the same sequence of prices and differ only in the initial endowments of capital, \( k^0_i \).

Therefore, comparing equilibrium allocations of capital across countries is equivalent to doing comparative statics with respect to \( k^0_i \) on the planner’s problem (35).
Proposition 3. In a model with infinitely lived consumers that satisfies assumptions A.1–A.6, let \( \{k_i^t\}, \{k_i'^t\} \), \( t = 0,1,..., \) be the equilibrium capital stocks for two countries \( i \) and \( i' \). Assume that 
\[
\overline{k}_0^i > \overline{k}_0^{i'}.
\]
Then \( k_i^t \geq k_i'^t \) for all \( t \). Furthermore, if \( x_i^t > 0 \), then \( k_i^t > k_i'^t \) implies \( k_{i+1}^t > k_{i+1}'^t \).

The proof of proposition 3 applies a monotonicity argument similar to those of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) to the country social planner’s problem.

5.3. Steady states

In this section, we analyze the properties of steady states of the model with infinitely lived consumers.

Definition 5. A nontrivial steady state is a steady state in which aggregate capital is positive,
\[
\hat{k} = \sum_{i=1}^n L_i^{i'} \hat{k}_i^{i'} / \sum_{i=1}^n L_i' > 0 , \text{ that is, } \hat{k}_i^{i'} > 0 , \text{ for some } i = 1,...,n.
\]

Bajona and Kehoe (2006) construct an example in which \( \phi_\ell(k,\ell) = \ell \) and in which one country has zero capital in the steady state but the other country has positive capital.

Proposition 4: In a model with infinitely lived consumers that satisfies A.1–A.6, there is factor price equalization in any nontrivial steady state.

Proposition 5: In a model with infinitely lived consumers that satisfies A.1–A.6, if there exists a nontrivial steady state, there exists a continuum of them. These steady states have the same prices and the same aggregate capital-labor ratio, \( \hat{k} \). The steady states are parameterized by the distribution of capital per worker across countries, \( \hat{k}^i,...,\hat{k}^n \). Furthermore, international trade occurs in every steady state in which \( \hat{k}_i^t \neq \hat{k} \) for some \( i = 1,...,n \).

Proposition 5 is a standard result in dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models where countries only differ in their initial factor endowments. Chen (1992), Baxter (1992) and Bond, Trask and Wang (2003) derive similar results in environments only slightly different from ours.

The next example illustrates the dependence of the steady state distribution of capital on the initial distribution.
Example 1. Consider a discrete-time version of the model studied by Ventura (1997). There are \( n \) countries. We assume that the production functions for the traded goods each use one factor of production:

\[
\begin{align*}
\phi_1(k_1, \ell_1) &= k_1 \quad \text{(36)} \\
\phi_2(k_2, \ell_2) &= \ell_2 \quad \text{(37)}
\end{align*}
\]

This assumption ensures that factor price equalization always holds:

\[
\begin{align*}
r_i^j &= r_i = p_{1i} \quad \text{(38)} \\
w_i^j &= w_i = p_{2i} \quad \text{(39)}
\end{align*}
\]

We further assume that the model is one-sector aggregatable with a Cobb-Douglas investment-consumption function:

\[
f(x_1, x_2) = dx_1^a x_2^{1-a}. \quad \text{(40)}
\]

Making the additional assumptions that \( \delta = 1 \) and that \( \nu(c) = \log c \), we can write the country social planner’s problem (35) as

\[
\begin{align*}
\max & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log c_i^j \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad c_i^j + k_{i+1}^j \leq p_{1i} k_i^j + p_{2i} \\
& \quad c_i^j \geq 0, \quad k_i^j \geq 0 \\
& \quad k_i^j \leq k_0^i.
\end{align*}
\]

Since factor price equalization holds, as long as there are no corner solutions in investment, we can use the integrated approach to solve for equilibrium. To find the equilibrium of the integrated economy, we solve the social planner’s problem

\[
\begin{align*}
\max & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log c_i \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad c_t + k_{t+1} \leq dk_t^a \\
& \quad c_t \geq 0, \quad k_t \geq 0 \\
& \quad k_0 \leq \bar{k}_0.
\end{align*}
\]
The textbook solution to this problem, first obtained by Brock and Mirman (1972), is
\[
 k_{t+1} = \beta a d k_t = (\beta a d)^{(1-a')/(1-a')} \bar{k}_0^{d'} , \quad c_t = (1-\beta a) dk_t = (1-\beta a) d (\beta a d)^{(1-a')/(1-a')} \bar{k}_0^{d'} . \tag{43}
\]

Using the first-order conditions, the feasibility conditions, and the solution (43), we obtain
\[
c_{t} = (1-\beta a) k_t , \quad c_{2t} = 1-\beta a && \tag{44}
\]
\[
x_{t} = \beta a k_t , \quad x_{2t} = \beta a && \tag{45}
\]
\[
p_{t} = adk_t^{a-1} , \quad p_{2t} = (1-a) dk_t^a . \tag{46}
\]

To disaggregate across countries, we start by comparing the first-order conditions for the country social planner’s problem (35) with those for the integrated economy equilibrium. (It is here that the assumption of no corner solutions in investment is important.)

\[
\frac{c_{t+1}^i}{c_t} = \beta p_{t+1} = \beta r_{t+1} = \frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} . \tag{47}
\]

Using (47) and the budget constraint in (41), we can write the demand of the consumer in country \(i\) in period \(t\) as
\[
c_t^i = (1-\beta) \left[ \sum_{x=t}^{\infty} \left( \prod_{x'=t}^{x-1} \frac{1}{p_{t,x}} \right) p_{2x} + p_{2x} k_t^i \right] . \tag{48}
\]

Subtracting the analogous condition for the integrated economy, we obtain
\[
c_t^i - c_t = (1-\beta) p_t (k_t^i - k_t) . \tag{49}
\]

The budget constraints in (41) for country \(i\) and for the integrated economy imply that
\[
c_{t}^i - c_t + k_{t+1}^i - k_{t+1} = (1+r_t-\delta)(k_t^i - k_t) . \tag{50}
\]

We can combine (47), (49), and (50) to obtain
\[
k_{t+1}^i - k_{t+1} = \frac{c_t}{c_{t-1}} (k_t^i - k_t) . \tag{51}
\]

Setting \(z_t = c_{t-1} / k_t = (1-\beta a)/(\beta a), t = 1, 2, \ldots, \) and \(z_0 = c_0 / (\beta r_0 k_0) = (1-\beta a)/(\beta a), \) we obtain
\[
\frac{k_{t+1} - k_{t+1}}{k_{t+1}} = \frac{z_{t+1}}{z_t} \left( \frac{k_{t+1} - k_t}{k_t} \right) = \frac{z_{t+1}}{z_0} \left( \frac{\bar{k}_t - \bar{k}_0}{\bar{k}_0} \right) = \frac{\bar{k}_0 - \bar{k}_0}{\bar{k}_0},
\]
which implies that \( \frac{k^i_t}{k_t} \) is constant. Letting \( \gamma^i = \bar{k}_i^0 / \bar{k}_0 \), we can solve for \( c^i_t / c_0 \) to produce
\[
c^i_{t+1} = (1 - a + \gamma^i a - \gamma^i \beta a) k_t,
\]
\[
c^i_{t+2} = 1 - a + \gamma^i a - \gamma^i \beta a
\]
\[
x^i_{t+1} = \gamma^i \beta a k_t, x^i_{t+2} = \gamma^i \beta a.
\]
Comparing levels of income per capita, measured in current prices, across countries, we obtain
\[
y^i = \frac{y^i_{t+1}}{y_t} = \frac{p_{t+1} k^i_{t+1} + p_{t+2} k^i_{t+2}}{p_t k^i_t + p_{t+2} k^i_{t+2}} = \gamma^i \beta a k_t + (1 - a) \beta a k_t = 1 - a + \gamma^i a.
\]
We now see the strong consequences of proposition 3. In a world of closed countries, we expect every country to converge to the same steady state capital-labor ratio and level of income per capita,
\[
\hat{k} = (\beta ad)^{1/(1-a)}, \quad \hat{\gamma} = d (\beta ad)^{a/(1-a)}
\]
no matter what its initial endowment of capital. In a world of countries open to trade, however, differences in initial endowments of capital lead to persistently different capital stocks and income levels. In this example, in fact, differences stay proportionally fixed. As the world economy converges to its steady state, each country converges to a steady state that depends on its initial endowment of capital relative to the world average, \( \gamma^i = \bar{k}_i^0 / \bar{k}_0 \),
\[
\hat{k}^i = \gamma^i (\beta ad)^{1/(1-a)}, \quad \hat{\gamma} = (1 - a + \gamma^i a) d (\beta ad)^{a/(1-a)}.
\]

5.4. Sustained growth paths

Equilibria in both one- and two-sector growth models can exhibit sustained growth. (See, for example, Rebelo 1991.) Since our model generalizes these closed economy models to a world with trade, sustained growth is also possible here. The next proposition extends the results in the previous section to the limiting behavior of equilibria that exhibit sustained growth.
Proposition 6: In a model with infinitely lived consumers that satisfies A.1–A.6, assume that there exists an equilibrium in which \( \lim_{i \to \infty} k^i_{t+1} / k^i_t = \lim_{i \to \infty} c^i_{t+1} / c^i_t = \gamma^i \) for \( 0 < \gamma^i < \infty \) for all \( i \) and \( \gamma^i > 1 \) for some \( i \). Then \( \gamma^i = \gamma \) for all \( i \). In this equilibrium with sustained growth, factor prices are equalized in the limit. Furthermore, if there exists a sustained growth path, there is a continuum of them, all of which have the same prices and aggregate capital-labor ratio, \( k^i_t \), but differ in the initial allocation of capital per worker, \( k^i_0 \), and the limiting distribution of capital across countries, \( \lim_{i \to \infty} k^i_t / k^i_0 \). International trade occurs in the limit of any equilibrium with sustained growth in which \( \lim_{i \to \infty} k^i_t / k^i_0 \neq 1 \) for some \( i = 1, \ldots, n \).

It is worth noting a limitation of proposition 6. While sustained growth is defined in terms of the infimum limit of \( k^i_{t+1} / k^i_t \) and \( c^i_{t+1} / c^i_t \), the proposition, which characterizes the limiting behavior of equilibria, requires that the limits of these variables exist. On the other hand, rather than assuming that these limits are equal across countries, the proposition proves that they are equal. It is also worth noting that the proposition does not rule out the possibility that \( \lim_{i \to \infty} w^i_t = \infty \). If \( \lim_{i \to \infty} w^i_t = \infty \) for some \( i \), however, the proposition proves that it does so for all \( i \). Furthermore, it is easy to show that, even if \( \lim_{i \to \infty} w^i_t = \infty \),

\[
\lim_{i \to \infty} \frac{w^i_t}{p_{it}y^i_{it} + p_{2t}y^i_{2t}} = 0.
\]  

Consequently, even if the wage grows without bound, it does so slowly enough that, in the limit, the economy behaves like an economy with no labor. (See Bajona and Kehoe 2006.)

The next example shows that the limiting distribution of capital in an equilibrium with sustained growth depends on the initial distribution, just as example 1 does in the case of an equilibrium that converges to a steady state.

Example 2. Consider a world economy identical to that in example 1 except that the production function for consumption and investment is of the general constant-elasticity-of-substitution form

\[
g(c_1, c_2) = f(c_1, c_2) = d \left( ac_1^b + (1 - a)c_2^b \right)^{1/b}.
\]  

(59)
Assume that $b > 0$ and $\beta a^{1/b} d > 1$. To find the equilibrium of the integrated economy, we solve the social planner’s problem

$$\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log c_t$$

s.t. $c_t + k_{t+1} \leq d \left( ac_t + (1-a)c_2^{1/b} \right)$

$$c_t \geq 0, \quad k_t \geq 0$$

$$k_0 \leq \bar{k}_0.$$  

The solution to path for this problem exhibits sustained growth. Bajona and Kehoe (2006) show that along this path $z_t = c_{t-1}/k_t$ decreases and that

$$\hat{z} = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{c_t}{k_{t+1}} = \frac{1-\beta}{\beta}.$$  

The analogue of equation (52) holds:

$$\frac{k_t' - k_t}{k_t} = \frac{z_t}{z_0} \left( \frac{\bar{k}_0 - k_t}{\bar{k}_0} \right),$$

although $z_t / z_0$ is not equal to 1 as it is in example 1. The limiting distribution of capital is determined by the equation

$$\frac{k_i' - k_i}{k} = \frac{\hat{k}}{z_0} \left( \frac{\bar{k}_0 - k}{\bar{k}_0} \right).$$

5.5. Cycles and chaos

Equilibria in two-sector growth models do not need to converge to a steady state or to a sustained growth path. Instead, the equilibrium may exhibit cycles or complex dynamics. General conditions for the existence of two-period cycles in two-sector growth models are presented by Benhabib and Nishimura (1985) and conditions for chaos are presented by Deneckere and Pelikan (1986), Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986), and Boldrin (1989), among others. In what follows, we present a specific example that has complex dynamics based on the two-sector closed economy model developed by Boldrin and Deneckere (1990).
Example 3. Consider a world with two countries, each of which has a measure one of consumers. Consumers have the period utility function

\[ u(c_1, c_2) = c_1^\alpha c_2^{1-\alpha}, \]  

where \( \alpha = 0.03 \). The production function of the investment good uses the traded goods in fixed proportions:

\[ f(x_1, x_2) = \min\left[ x_1, x_2 / \gamma \right], \]

where \( \gamma = 0.09 \). The production for the traded goods is such that each of the traded goods uses only one factor of production as in (36) and (37). Furthermore, \( \delta = 1 \).

Boldrin and Deneckere (1990) show that such an economy exhibits stable two-period cycles for \( \beta \in [0.093, 0.095] \) and chaos for \( \beta \in [0.099, 0.112] \). If \( k_0 = k_2 \), then the equilibrium of the two-country economy coincides exactly with the equilibrium of the closed economy. If \( k_0 \neq k_2 \), if one country finds it optimal to increase its capital stock, so does the other country. Therefore, capital-labor ratios in both countries cycle in the same direction, mimicking the oscillations of the integrated equilibrium. Chen (1992) makes a similar argument for a slightly different model.

Notice that in this example \( u \) is not strictly concave and \( f \) is not continuously differentiable. Given that the property of having cycles or chaos is structurally stable, however, it would be easy to perturb the utility and investment functions to construct examples that satisfy assumptions A.3 and A.5 and that have equilibria with cycles or chaos.

The methodology used in this example is general and allows the construction of a two-country trade model starting from any closed economy model with a consumption sector and an investment sector, such as the model developed by Uzawa (1964). Let \( g(k, \ell) \) be the production function for the consumption good, \( f(k, \ell) \) be the production function for the investment good, and \( \nu(c) \) be the utility function in the two-sector closed economy model. We set \( \phi_1(k, \ell) = k \), \( \phi_2(k, \ell) = \ell \), and \( u(c_1, c_2) = \nu\left( g(c_1, c_2) \right) \).

In the cycle in example 3, factor prices are equalized in every period. In fact, this is the only sort of equilibrium cycle that is possible, at least if investment is positive.
**Proposition 7**: In a model with infinitely lived consumers that satisfies A.1–A.6, assume that there exists an equilibrium \(s\)-period cycle, \(1 < s < \infty\) with \(x'_i > 0\) for all \(i\) and all \(t\). Then factor price equalization occurs in every period of the cycle.

To prove this proposition in the appendix, we argue that, if an equilibrium with a finite cycle exists, countries have to change relative factor abundance at least once over the cycle. This implies that they have to change relative factor abundance an infinite number of times along the equilibrium path, which contradicts proposition 3.

As we have seen in lemma 2 and example 1, if consumers aggregate the two traded goods to obtain utility in the same way that firms aggregate these goods to obtain investment, then the equilibrium allocation of the integrated economy solves a one-sector social planner’s problem. Although the integrated economy approach to characterizing equilibria applies only when we can ensure factor price equalization, the assumption of one-sector aggregatability coupled with proposition 7 puts strong restrictions on equilibrium dynamics.

**Proposition 8**: Assume that a model with infinitely lived consumers satisfies A.1–A.6 and is one-sector aggregatable. Also assume that \(x'_i > 0\) for all \(i\) and all \(t\). Then there cannot exist an equilibrium with cycles.

### 6. Results for economies with overlapping generations

In this section, we derive some general results for equilibrium paths of the overlapping generations model. In a closed economy setting, overlapping generations models exhibit a richer variety of possible behavior than do infinitely lived consumer models. In particular, multiple steady states and cyclical behavior can appear in one-sector, closed economy models with homothetic period utility functions and C.E.S. production functions. This richness in behavior of the closed economy models carries over to Heckscher-Ohlin models with overlapping generations, and make such models significantly different from infinitely lived consumer models.

It is also worth noting that, in closed economy models with infinitely lived consumers, equilibria are generically determinate, while in closed economy models with overlapping generations, there are robust examples with indeterminate equilibria. (See Kehoe and Levine 1985 and the related literature.) Although these sorts of results can be expected to carry over to dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models, we do not pursue these matters in this paper.
6.1. Steady state analysis

In contrast with infinitely lived consumer models, an overlapping generations model can have a steady state in which factor prices do not equalize. If prices do equalize in a steady state, however, then all countries behave in exactly the same way, and there is no trade.

**Proposition 9:** In a model with overlapping generations that satisfies assumptions A.1–A.4 and A.5′–A.6′, assume that there is a nontrivial steady state in which factor prices equalize. Then \( \hat{k}' = \hat{k} \) is in the interior of the cone of diversification and there is no international trade in this steady state.

**Proposition 10:** In a model with overlapping generations that satisfies assumptions A.1–A.4 and A.5′–A.6′, any equilibrium that converges to a steady state in which there is factor price equalization reaches factor price equalization and no trade within a finite number of periods. In particular, the equilibrium becomes autarkic once all generations alive have been born under factor price equalization.

As in the infinitely lived consumer environment, these results can be extended to economies with equilibria that converge to sustained growth paths. Sustained growth, however, can occur only for economies that are not one-sector aggregatable and under strong conditions. See Jones and Manuelli 1992 and Fisher 1992 for details.

**Proposition 11:** Suppose that a model with overlapping generations satisfies assumptions A.1–A.4 and A.5′–A.6′ and is one-sector aggregatable. Then an equilibrium cannot display sustained growth.

This proposition follows directly from theorem 1 in Fisher (1992). The intuition is that, because the production functions are concave, the ratio of wage income relative to the capital stock converges to zero as capital goes to infinity. Therefore, wage income is not able to purchase an ever growing capital stock.

Jones and Manuelli (1992) present an example of a two-sector overlapping generations economy with sustained growth and Fisher (1992) derives necessary conditions for equilibria with sustained growth to occur. These conditions are strong and involve both production technologies...
and utility functions. It is easy to turn the Jones-Manuelli (1992) example into a two-country Heckscher-Ohlin example as in example 3.

6.2. General structure of examples

As we have mentioned, overlapping generations economies can have steady states where factor prices do not equalize across countries. In what follows, we describe a general methodology for the construction of model economies with such properties starting from one-sector closed economy models. We then use our methodology to derive four different examples that have steady states without factor price equalization.

The general structure of our examples is that of a model with two countries, \( i = 1, 2 \) with C.E.S. production functions for the traded goods:

\[
\phi_j(k, \ell) = \theta_j \left( \alpha_j k_j^\rho + (1 - \alpha_j) \ell_j^\rho \right)^{1/\rho},
\]

for \( \rho < 1, \rho \neq 0 \), and

\[
\phi_j(k, \ell) = \theta_j k_j^{\alpha_j} \ell_j^{1-\alpha_j},
\]

for \( \rho = 0 \). We assume that \( \alpha_2 = \alpha, \alpha_1 = \alpha + \varepsilon, \theta_2 = \theta, \) and \( \theta_1 = \theta + \lambda \varepsilon \) for \( 1 > \alpha > 0, \varepsilon > 0, \theta > 0 \), and \( \lambda \). This relationship between the parameters allows us to express the capital-labor ratios that determine the cone of diversification as functions of \( \alpha, \varepsilon, \theta, \) and \( \lambda \). Notice that \( \varepsilon > 0 \) guarantees that good 1 is the capital intensive good.

The production function for the investment good is Cobb-Douglas:

\[
f(x_1, x_2) = dx_1^a x_2^{1-a}
\]

where \( 1 > a > 0 \). Capital depreciates completely, \( \delta = 1 \).

There is a measure one of consumers of each generation in each country. The representative consumer in each generation \( t \) in country \( i \) lives for two periods, has labor endowments \((\bar{\ell}^i, \bar{\ell}^i)\), and has the utility function

\[
\beta_1 \log \left( c_{1t}^i \right)^a \left( c_{2t}^i \right)^{1-a} + \beta_2 \log \left( c_{1t+1}^i \right)^a \left( c_{2t+1}^i \right)^{1-a}.
\]

(69)

Notice that, since the parameter \( a \) in the utility function is the same as that in the production function for the investment good, the model is one-sector aggregatable.
To find the cone of diversification when $\rho \neq 0$, we calculate the optimal capital-labor ratios in interior solutions to the revenue maximization problem (31). When $\rho \neq 0$, the solution is

$$\kappa_1(\frac{p_2}{p_1}) = \left(\frac{1 - \alpha_2}{\alpha_1}\right)^{1/(1-\rho)} \left(\frac{(1 - \alpha_2)\theta_2 p_2 / p_1}{\alpha_1} - \frac{\rho}{(1-\rho)} \frac{(1 - \alpha_2)\theta_1 p_2 / p_1}{\alpha_1} - \frac{\rho}{(1-\rho)} \frac{(1 - \alpha_2)\theta_1 p_2 / p_1}{\alpha_1} \right)^{1/\rho}$$

(70)

and

$$\kappa_2(\frac{p_2}{p_1}) = \left[\left(\frac{1 - \alpha_1}{\alpha_2}\right)^{1/(1-\rho)} \kappa_1(\frac{p_2}{p_1})\right].$$

(71)

When $\rho = 0$, these functions become

$$\kappa_1(\frac{p_2}{p_1}) = \left[\frac{1 - \alpha_1}{\alpha_2}\left(\frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1}\left(1 - \frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1}\right)^{1/(1-\rho)} \right)^{1/(1-\rho)} \right].$$

(72)

and

$$\kappa_2(\frac{p_2}{p_1}) = \left(\frac{1 - \alpha_1}{\alpha_2}\right) \kappa_1(\frac{p_2}{p_1}).$$

(73)

Together with the endowments of capital and labor, the parameters $\epsilon$, $\lambda$, $d$, and $a$ determine the pattern of specialization and trade. As $\alpha_1 = \alpha + \epsilon$ and $\alpha_2 = \alpha$ become more similar as $\epsilon$ approaches zero, the cone of diversification narrows, collapsing into a straight line when $\epsilon = 0$. We set $p_2 / p_1 = 1$, $\alpha_2 = \alpha$, $\alpha_1 = \alpha + \epsilon$, $\theta_2 = \theta$, and $\theta_1 = \theta + \lambda \epsilon$ and use l'Hôpital’s rule to take limits as $\epsilon$ tends to 0 to obtain

$$\kappa_1(1) = \kappa_2(1) = \left(\frac{\theta - (1 - \alpha)\rho \lambda}{\theta + \alpha \rho \lambda}\right)^{1/\rho}$$

(74)

if $\rho \neq 0$ and

$$\kappa_1(1) = \kappa_2(1) = e^{-\lambda / \theta}$$

(75)

if $\rho = 0$. By choosing $\lambda$ appropriately, we can make this degenerate cone of diversification pass through any point.
We set the parameters $d$ and $a$ so that $p_1 = p_2 = 1$. The first-order conditions for utility maximization and for profit maximization in the investment sector imply that

$$\frac{ac^i}{(1-a)c^i} = \frac{ax^i}{(1-a)x^i} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}. \tag{76}$$

Feasibility and $L^1 = L^2 = 1$ imply that

$$\frac{c^i}{c^i} = \frac{x^i}{x^i} = \frac{x^i + x^i}{x^i + x^i} = \frac{y_2^1 + y_2^2}{y_1^1 + y_1^2} \tag{77}$$

which implies that

$$a = \frac{y_1^1 + y_1^2}{y_1^1 + y_1^2 + y_2^2 + y_2^2}. \tag{78}$$

If $p_1 = p_2 = q = 1$, we can use the first-order condition for profit maximization into the investment sector with respect to $x^i$ to obtain

$$1 = ad \left( \frac{y_1^1 + y_2^2}{y_1^1 + y_2^2} \right)^{1-a} \tag{79}$$

which implies that

$$d = \frac{1}{a \left( \frac{y_1^1 + y_2^2}{y_1^1 + y_2^2} \right)^{1-a}} = \frac{y_1^1 + y_2^2 + y_1^1 + y_1^2}{y_1^1 + y_1^2} \left( \frac{y_1^1 + y_1^2}{y_1^1 + y_2^2} \right)^{\frac{y_1^1 + y_2^2}{y_1^1 + y_2^2}} \tag{80}.$$  

We derive each of our examples starting with a one-sector, closed-economy, overlapping generations model that has multiple steady states. Let $\phi_2(k, \ell)$ be the production function of this model. Let $\theta = \theta_2$ and $\alpha = \alpha_2$ be the parameters of this production function. We then construct another one-sector, closed economy model that preserves the steady state behavior of the original model by slightly perturbing this production function. Let $\phi_1(k, \ell)$ with parameters $\alpha_1 = \alpha + \varepsilon$ and $\theta_1 = \theta + \varepsilon \lambda$ be the production function of this perturbed model. The key is to find values of $\varepsilon$ and $\lambda$ so that there exists a steady state of the original model with capital-labor ratio and factor prices
\((\hat{k}^2, \hat{r}^2, \hat{w}^2)\) and a steady state of the perturbed version of the model with capital-labor ratio and factor prices \((\hat{k}^1, \hat{r}^1, \hat{w}^1)\) that satisfy

\[\hat{k}^1 > \hat{k}^2, \quad \hat{r}^1 < \hat{r}^2, \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{w}^1 > \hat{w}^2\]  

(81)

and

either \(\hat{k}^1 > \kappa_1(1)\) or \(\hat{k}^2 < \kappa_2(1)\), or both.  (82)

Condition (82) implies that, in a two-sector, two-country economy with production functions \(\phi_1(k, \ell)\) and \(\phi_2(k, \ell)\), at least one country specializes in production if prices are \(p_1 = p_2 = 1\) and countries’ capital-labor ratios are \(\hat{k}^i, \ i = 1,2\). Condition (81) implies that \(\hat{r}^i\) and \(\hat{w}^i\) are consistent with lemma 1. We can choose \(\lambda\) so that condition (82) holds. Specifically, we choose \(\lambda\) so that the cone of diversification passes between the steady state \(\hat{k}^2\) of the original one-sector model and the steady state \(\hat{k}^1\) of the perturbed one-sector model when \(\varepsilon = 0\) and then increase \(\varepsilon\). Whether or not condition (81) holds in the constructed two-sector model depends on the properties of the original one-sector model, as we will see in examples in the next section.

By choosing \(d\) and \(a\) so that \(p_1 = p_2 = 1\), we ensure that trade is balanced. In any steady state of a one-sector model, we can add up budget constraints to obtain

\[
\hat{c}^i + \hat{x}^i = \sum_{b=1}^{2} (\hat{c}^{ib} + \hat{x}^{ib}) = \sum_{b=1}^{2} \hat{w}^i \ell^b + \hat{r}^i \hat{k}^i = \hat{w}^i + \hat{r}^i \hat{k}^i. \tag{83}
\]

We construct the two sectors so that

\[
\hat{w}^i + \hat{r}^i \hat{k}^i = \hat{p}_1 \hat{y}_1^i + \hat{p}_2 \hat{y}_2^i. \tag{84}
\]

Since \(p_1 = p_2 = 1\), we know that \(\hat{c}^i = d(\hat{c}_1^i)(\hat{c}_2^i)^{1-a} = \hat{c}_1^i + \hat{c}_2^i\) and analogously for \(\hat{x}^i\). Consequently,

\[
\hat{c}_1^i + \hat{c}_2^i + \hat{x}_1^i + \hat{x}_2^i = \hat{c}_1^i + \hat{c}_2^i = \hat{y}_1^i + \hat{y}_2^i. \tag{85}
\]

\[
(\hat{y}_1^i - \hat{c}_1^i - \hat{x}_1^i) + (\hat{y}_2^i - \hat{c}_2^i - \hat{x}_2^i) = 0. \tag{86}
\]

6.3. Steady state examples

Using the methodology developed in the previous section, we construct four examples of two-country economies that have steady states where factor prices are not equal across countries.
In the first two examples, there is positive fiat money in one of the countries but not the other. In the other two examples, there is no fiat money.

**Example 4.** Consider a one-sector, closed economy model where the representative consumer in generation \( t \) has the utility function

\[
\log c_t + 2 \log c_{t+1}
\]  

(87)

and the labor endowment is \((\ell^1, \ell^2) = (0.8, 0.2)\). The production function is

\[
y = \phi(k, \ell) = 4k^{0.25} \ell^{0.75}.
\]  

(88)

This economy has two steady states: a steady state with no fiat money where \( \hat{b} = 0, \hat{k} = 1.4675, \hat{r} = 0.75, \) and \( \hat{w} = 3.3019 \) and a steady state with positive fiat money where \( \hat{b} = 0.4, \hat{k} = 1, \hat{r} = 1, \) and \( \hat{w} = 3 \). Notice that the steady state without fiat money has a higher capital-labor ratio, a lower rental rate, and a higher wage than does the steady state with fiat money, allowing us to construct an example that satisfies lemma 1.

We perturb the production function \( \phi_2 \) to

\[
y = \phi_2(k, \ell) = 3.96k^{0.3} \ell^{0.7}.
\]  

(89)

That is, we set \( \varepsilon = 0.05 \) and \( \lambda = -0.8 \). The perturbed economy also has two steady states. The steady state without fiat money has \( \hat{b} = 0, \hat{k} = 1.4219, \hat{r} = 0.9286, \) and \( \hat{w} = 3.0807 \).

Consider now a two-country, two-sector economy where good 1 has production function \( \phi_1 \) and good 2 has the production function \( \phi_2 \). The cone of diversification for the two-country economy for \( \hat{p}_1 = \hat{p}_2 = 1 \) is determined by \( \hat{k}_1(1) = 1.0757 \) and \( \hat{k}_2(1) = 1.3830 \). Set the steady state capital-labor ratio in country 1 to \( \hat{k}^1 = 1.4219 \) and in country 2 to \( \hat{k}^2 = 1 \). We now have a steady state of the two-country, two-good economy where country 1 specializes in the production of good 1, producing \( \hat{y}_1^1 = 4.4010 \) and \( \hat{y}_2^1 = 0 \), and country 2 specializes in the production of good 2, producing \( \hat{y}_1^2 = 0 \) and \( \hat{y}_2^2 = 4 \). Figure 3 depicts the cone of diversification for this world economy. To ensure that \( p_1 = p_2 = 1 \), set \( d = 1.9977 \) and \( a = 0.5239 \). Factor prices do not equalize in this steady state: \( \hat{p}^1 = 0.9286 \) and \( \hat{w}^1 = 3.0807 \), but \( \hat{p}^2 = 1 \) and \( \hat{w}^2 = 3 \).
The calculation of the other variables is straightforward. Since $\hat{c}_1 = 1.0427$ and $\hat{c}_2 = 1.9364$ in the steady state of the perturbed one-sector economy, for example, and 

$$(\hat{y}_1^1 + \hat{y}_2^2)/(\hat{y}_1^1 + \hat{y}_2^2 + \hat{y}_1^2 + \hat{y}_2^2) = 4.4010/8.4010 = 0.5239,$$

we set $\hat{c}_{11}^1 = (0.5239)1.0427 = 0.5462$, 

$\hat{c}_{21}^2 = (1-0.5239)1.0427 = 0.4965$, $\hat{c}_{12}^1 = 1.0144$, and $\hat{c}_{22}^2 = 0.9220$. Similarly, since 

$\hat{x}_1^1 = \hat{k}_1^1 = 1.4219$, we set $\hat{x}_1^1 = 0.7449$ and $\hat{x}_2^1 = 0.6770$. Notice that trade is balanced: Country 1 exports 

$\hat{y}_1^1 - \hat{c}_{11}^1 - \hat{c}_{12}^1 - \hat{x}_1^1 = 4.4010 - 0.5462 - 1.0144 - 0.7449 = 2.0955$ of good 1 and imports 

$\hat{c}_{21}^1 + \hat{c}_{22}^1 + \hat{x}_2^1 - \hat{y}_1^1 = 0.4965 + 0.9220 + 0.6770 - 0 = 2.0955$ of good 2.

**Example 5.** Consider a modification of example 4 where $\theta_1 = 3.92$. That is, we set $\lambda = -1.6$. The cone of diversification is now determined by $\hat{k}_2(1) = 1.3179$ and $\hat{k}_1(1) = 1.6944$, and 

$\hat{k}_1^1 = 1.4507$ is in its interior, as depicted in figure 4. In this steady state, country 1 diversifies in production, producing $\hat{y}_1^1 = 1.6201$ and $\hat{y}_2^1 = 2.7736$, and country 2 specializes in the production of good 2, producing $\hat{y}_1^2 = 0$ and $\hat{y}_2^2 = 4$. To ensure that $\hat{p}_1 = \hat{p}_2 = 1$, we set $d = 1.6332$ and $a = 0.1930$. Factor prices do not equalize: $\hat{r}^1 = 0.8130$ and $\hat{w}^1 = 3.2143$, but, once again, $\hat{r}^2 = 1$ and $\hat{w}^2 = 3$.

**Example 6.** Consider now a model with the same utility function and labor endowments as in examples 4 and 5, but where the production function is 

$$y = \phi_{\ell}(k, \ell) = 4\left(0.25k^{-3} + 0.75\ell^{-3}\right)^{-1/3} \quad (90)$$

The one-sector closed economy model has three steady states. In one steady state, $\hat{b} = 0.4$ and $\hat{k} = 1$. In the other two, $\hat{b} = 0$ and either $\hat{k} = 0.5675$ or $\hat{k} = 1.3355$. When $\hat{k} = 0.5675$, $\hat{r} = 0.75$ and $\hat{w} = 3.3019$, and, when $\hat{k} = 1.3355$, $\hat{r} = 0.75$ and $\hat{w} = 3.3019$, allowing us to construct an example that satisfies lemma 1.

The production function for the perturbed economy is 

$$y = \phi_{\ell}(k, \ell) = 4\left(0.3k^{-3} + 0.7\ell^{-3}\right)^{-1/3}. \quad (91)$$

That is, we set $\varepsilon = 0.05$ and $\lambda = 0$. The perturbed economy has also three steady states, one steady state with positive fiat money and two steady states with no fiat money.
The cone of diversification is now determined by \( \hat{k}_2(1) = 0.9687 \) and \( \hat{k}_1(1) = 1.0315 \). Set the capital-labor ratio in country 1 to \( \hat{k}^1 = 1.3908 \), which is the perturbation of the steady state of the one-sector model where \( \hat{k} = 1.3355 \), and set the capital-labor ratio in country 2 to \( \hat{k}^2 = 0.5675 \). Country 1 specializes in good 1, producing \( \hat{y}_1^1 = 4.2884 \) and \( \hat{y}_2^1 = 0 \), and country 2 specializes in the production of good 2, producing \( \hat{y}_1^2 = 0 \) and \( \hat{y}_2^1 = 3.1147 \). To ensure that \( \hat{\rho}_1 = \hat{\rho}_2 = 1 \), we set \( d = 1.9749 \) and \( a = 0.5793 \). Factor prices do not equalize: \( \hat{r}^1 = 0.4237 \) and \( \hat{w}^1 = 3.6991 \), but \( \hat{r}^2 = 3.5452 \) and \( \hat{w}^2 = 1.1029 \).

The essential step in the construction of this example is to start with a one-sector closed economy model that has multiple steady states without fiat money. It is impossible to do this with a model with logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas production. Consider such a model with production function \( \phi_2(k, \ell) = \theta k^\alpha \ell^{1-\alpha} \), utility function \( \beta_1 \log c'_i + \beta_2 \log c'_{i+1} \), and labor endowments \((\ell^1, \ell^2)\). The unique steady state without fiat money is the solution to

\[
\begin{align*}
k &= w(k) \ell^1 - c_1(w(k), r(k)) = (1 - \alpha) \theta k^\alpha \ell^1 - \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_1 + \beta_2} \left( (1 - \alpha) \theta k^\alpha \ell^1 + \frac{(1 - \alpha) \theta k^\alpha \ell^2}{\alpha \theta k^{1-\alpha}} \right).
\end{align*}
\]

(92)

It is

\[
\hat{k} = \left( \frac{\beta_2 (1 - \alpha) \alpha \theta \ell^1}{\beta_1 (1 - \alpha) \ell^2 + (\beta_1 + \beta_2) \alpha} \right) \left( \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \right).
\]

(93)

**Example 7.** This example uses a different perturbation of the one-sector closed economy model of example 6. In particular, this example exploits the fact that at one of the steady states without fiat money — the one where \( \hat{k} = 0.5675 \) — the steady state capital stock and the wage increase and the rental rate decreases as we increase \( \alpha \) to \( \alpha + \varepsilon \), thus allowing us to satisfy lemma 1. It is worth noting that we cannot do this at the other steady state without fiat money, where \( \hat{k} = 1.3355 \). Nor can we do this in a model with logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas production where

\[
\hat{r} = \alpha \theta \hat{k}^{\alpha-1} = \frac{\beta_1 (1 - \alpha) \ell^2 + (\beta_1 + \beta_2) \alpha}{\beta_2 (1 - \alpha) \ell^1} = \frac{\beta_1 \ell^2}{\beta_2 \ell^1} + \frac{(\beta_1 + \beta_2) \alpha}{\beta_2 (1 - \alpha) \ell^1}.
\]

(94)

Increasing \( \alpha \) to \( \alpha + \varepsilon \), the rental rate increases, \( \hat{r}^1 > \hat{r}^2 \), which implies that lemma 1 is violated.
Consider now the perturbation of the production function in example 6 where

\[ y = \phi(k, \ell) = 4.12(0.3k^{-3} + 0.7\ell^{-3})^{-1/3}. \]  

(95)

That is, we set \( \varepsilon = 0.05 \) and \( \lambda = 2.4 \). The steady state where \( \dot{k}^2 = 0.5675 \) becomes a steady state where \( \dot{k}^1 = 0.6305 \). The wage increases from \( \dot{w}^2 = 1.1029 \) to \( \dot{w}^1 = 1.2283 \), and the rental rate decreases from \( \dot{r}^2 = 3.5452 \) to \( \dot{r}^1 = 3.3283 \). The cone of diversification is determined by \( \dot{k}_2(1) = 0.5890 \) and \( \dot{k}_1(1) = 0.6271 \). Country 1 specializes in the production of good 1, producing \( \dot{y}^1 = 3.3305 \) and \( \dot{y}^2 = 0 \), and country 2 specializes in the production of good 2, producing \( \dot{y}^1 = 0 \) and \( \dot{y}^2 = 3.1147 \). To ensure that \( \dot{p}_1 = \dot{p}_2 = 1 \), we set \( d = 1.9990 \) and \( a = 0.5166 \).

### 6.4. Cycles and chaos

In this section, we present two examples of two-country economies that have equilibrium two-period cycles.

**Example 8.** We start by constructing a one-sector, pure exchange economy with an equilibrium two-period cycle. In this economy the representative consumer in generation \( t \) solves the problem

\[
\max 100c'_t - \frac{(c'_{t+1})^{-4}}{4} \\
\text{s.t. } c'_t + b'_{t+1} = 0.8 \\
\quad c'_{t+1} = 0.2 + (1 + r_{t+1}^b)b_{t+1} \\
\quad c'_t \geq 0, \quad c'_{t+1} \geq 0.
\]

(96)

We can think of this economy as a production economy with the production function \( y = \ell \) and the labor endowments \((\bar{\ell}^1, \bar{\ell}^2) = (0.8, 0.2)\). This economy has an equilibrium cycle of periodicity 2, with \((\hat{c}^1_t, \hat{c}^2_t, \hat{r}_t, \hat{b}_t)\) cycling between

\[(\hat{c}^1_t, \hat{c}^2_t, \hat{r}_t, \hat{b}_t) = (0.7670, 0.2330, -0.9314, 0.4803)\]

(97)

and

\[(\hat{c}^2_t, \hat{c}^1_t, \hat{r}_t, \hat{b}_t) = (0.3197, 0.6803, 13.5766, 3.295 \times 10^{-2})\]  

(98)
Notice that \((1 + \hat{r}_{1}^{b})(1 + \hat{r}_{2}^{b}) = 1\). Figure 5 depicts this cycle in an offer-curve diagram. The figure graphs the set of excess demands \((y', z') = (c_i' - 0.8, c_i'^{-1} - 0.2)\) that are utility maximizing for some \(r_{i+1}^{b}\) and the set of \(y'\) and \(z'\) that satisfy the feasibility condition \(z_i'^{-1} + y_i' = 0\). (See, for example, Kehoe 1989.)

The next step is to perturb this economy to allow production in which capital plays a role:

\[
y = \phi_2(k, \ell) = \left(0.1 k^{3/5} + 0.9 \ell^{3/5}\right)^{5/3}.
\] (99)

This one-sector economy with production has a cycle of periodicity 2, with \((\hat{k}_1, \hat{r}_1, \hat{w}_1, \hat{m}_1)\) cycling between

\[
(\hat{k}_1, \hat{r}_1, \hat{w}_1, \hat{h}_1) = (0.2214, 0.1754, 0.8639, 0.3958)
\] (100)

and

\[
(\hat{k}_2, \hat{r}_2, \hat{w}_2, \hat{h}_2) = (3.422 \times 10^{-5}, 5.6996, 0.8391, 6.945 \times 10^{-2})
\] (101)

Notice that \(\hat{r}_1 \hat{r}_2 = 1\).

We add another sector by perturbing production function in much the same way that we did in the steady state examples in the previous section:

\[
y = \phi_2(k, \ell) = 1.09 \left(0.15 k^{3/5} + 0.85 \ell^{3/5}\right)^{5/3}.
\] (102)

That is, we set \(\varepsilon = 0.05\) and \(\lambda = 1.8\). The two-sector economy has a two-period cycle where \(p_1 = p_2 = 1\) over the cycle and countries alternate their positions between

\[
(\hat{k}_1, \hat{r}_1, \hat{w}_1, \hat{h}_1) = (9.726 \times 10^{-2}, 0.3834, 0.8554, 0.3137)
\] (103)

and

\[
(\hat{k}_2, \hat{r}_2, \hat{w}_2, \hat{h}_2) = (2.418 \times 10^{-4}, 2.6083, 0.8394, 0.1203)
\] (104)

The cone of diversification for this economy is determined by \(\hat{k}_2(1) = 8.452 \times 10^{-3}\) and \(\hat{k}_1(1) = 2.687 \times 10^{-2}\). When a country has capital \(\hat{k}_1 = 9.726 \times 10^{-2}\), it specializes in the production of good 1, producing \(\hat{y}_{11} = 0.8926\) and \(\hat{y}_{21} = 0\), and, when it has capital \(\hat{k}_2 = 2.418 \times 10^{-4}\), it
specializes in the production of good 2, producing \( \hat{y}_{12} = 0 \) and \( \hat{y}_{22} = 0.8400 \). In the equilibrium cycle, countries change their specialization pattern every period. Because the countries are symmetric and alternate between the same two positions, the relative production of the two goods stays constant.

\[
\frac{y_{1t}^1 + y_{2t}^2}{y_{1t}^1 + y_{2t}^1 + y_{2t}^2} = \frac{0.8926}{0.8926 + 0.8400} = 0.5151. \tag{105}
\]

This allows us to ensure that \( p_1 = p_2 = 1 \) by setting \( d = 1.9991 \) and \( a = 0.5151 \).

**Example 9.** This example slightly modifies the production function of good 1 in example 8 so that one of the countries diversifies in production. In particular, we set \( \theta_1 = 1.07 \) by setting \( \lambda = 1.4 \).

The cone of diversification is now determined by \( \hat{k}_2(l) = 5.637 \times 10^{-2} \) and \( \hat{k}_1(l) = 0.1792 \). This economy has a cycle where countries alternate their positions between

\[
(\hat{k}_1, \hat{r}_1, \hat{w}_1, \hat{b}_1) = (0.1391, 0.2984, 0.8500, 0.3388) \tag{106}
\]

and

\[
(\hat{k}_2, \hat{r}_2, \hat{w}_2, \hat{b}_2) = (1.291 \times 10^{-4}, 3.3515, 0.8392, 0.1011). \tag{107}
\]

When a country has capital \( \hat{k}_1 = 0.1391 \), it now diversifies, producing \( \hat{y}_{11} = 0.6084 \) and \( \hat{y}_{21} = 0.2830 \), and, when it has capital \( \hat{k}_2 = 1.291 \times 10^{-4} \), it specializes in the production of good 2, producing \( \hat{y}_{12} = 0 \) and \( \hat{y}_{22} = 0.8397 \). Countries enter and exit the cone of diversification an infinite number of times. To ensure that \( p_1 = p_2 = 1 \), we set \( d = 1.9124 \) and \( a = 0.3515 \).

Notice proposition 7 implies that we cannot construct infinitely lived consumer examples like examples 8 and 9 where factor prices are not equalized. Proposition 8 also implies that we cannot construct infinitely lived consumer examples with any sort of cycle in models that are one-sector aggregatable.

As a final note, we observe that, as in the infinitely lived consumer environment, any two-sector, closed economy model with overlapping generations can be made into a trade model. Suppose that \( g(k, \ell) \) is the production function for the consumption good in the two-sector closed
economy model, that \( f(k, \ell) \) is the production function for the investment good, and that \( v_h(c) \) is the utility function in period of life \( h \). Set \( \phi_1(k, \ell) = k \), \( \phi_2(k, \ell) = \ell \), and \( u_h(c_1, c_2) = v_h(g(c_1, c_2)) \).

Since the cone of diversification is the entire nonnegative quadrant, factor prices equalize in any equilibrium. The equilibrium is autarkic after \( m + 1 \) periods, where \( m \) is the length of a consumer’s life. Consequently, all of the possibilities for equilibrium dynamics that are present in two-sector growth models with overlapping generations are also present in our model. In particular, two-sector, closed economy models with cyclical and chaotic behavior, like those constructed by Reichlin (1992), can be made into examples of Heckscher-Ohlin economies.
Appendix 1: Equations that characterize equilibrium

Common to both environments:

\[ i = 1, \ldots, n, \ t = 0,1, \ldots \]

\[ x^i_t = f(x^i_{1t}, x^i_{2t}) \]  \hfill (108)

\[ k^i_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) k^i_t = x^i_t \]  \hfill (109)

\[ \ell^i_{1t} + \ell^i_{2t} = 1 \]  \hfill (110)

\[ k^i_{1t} + k^i_{2t} = k^i_t . \]  \hfill (111)

\[ j = 1, 2 \]

\[ y^j_{jt} = \phi_j(k^j_{jt}, \ell^j_{jt}) \]  \hfill (112)

\[ r^i_t \geq p_{jt}\phi_k(k^j_{jt}, \ell^j_{jt}) , \text{ if } k^j_{jt} > 0 \]  \hfill (113)

\[ w^i_t \geq p_{jt}\phi_k(k^j_{jt}, \ell^j_{jt}) , \text{ if } \ell^j_{jt} > 0 \]  \hfill (114)

\[ p_{jt} = f_j(x^i_{1t}, x^i_{2t}) . \]  \hfill (115)

Specific to infinitely lived consumer environment:

\[ i = 1, \ldots, n \]

\[ k^i_0 = \bar{k}^i_0 \ , \ \bar{k}^i_0 = 0 \]  \hfill (116)

\[ t = 0,1, \ldots \]

\[ \frac{u_2(c^i_{1t}, c^i_{2t})}{u_1(c^i_{1t}, c^i_{2t})} = \frac{p_{2t}}{p_{1t}} \]  \hfill (117)

\[ \frac{u_1(c^i_{1t+1}, c^i_{2t+1})}{\beta u_1(c^i_{1t}, c^i_{2t})} = (1 + r^i_{t+1}) \frac{p_{1t}}{p_{1t+1}} \geq (1 + r^i_{t+1} - \delta) \frac{p_{1t}}{p_{1t+1}} , \text{ if } x^i_t > 0 \]  \hfill (118)

\[ p_{jt}c^i_{jt} + p_{2t}c^i_{2t} + x^i_t + b^i_{t+1} = w^i_{t+1} + (1 + r^i_t) b^i_t + (1 + r^i_t - \delta) k^i_t \]  \hfill (119)

\[ j = 1, 2 \]

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} L(c^i_j + x^i_j) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} L y^j_{jt} . \]  \hfill (120)

If there is international borrowing and lending,

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} Lb^i_j = 0 \]  \hfill (121)

\[ r^i_{t^{hi}} = r^h_i . \]  \hfill (122)
If there is no international borrowing and lending,

\[ b_i^t = 0. \]  

(123)

**Specific to overlapping generations environment:**

\[ i = 1, \ldots, n \]

\( k_0^{ih} = \bar{k}_0^{ih}, \quad k_0^{\bar{h}} = \bar{b}_0^{\bar{h}}, \quad h = 1 - m, \ldots, -1 \)

\[ t = 0, 1, \ldots \]

\[ x_i^t = \sum_{h=1}^{m-1} x_i^{t-h+1} \]  

(125)

\[ k_i^t = \sum_{h=2}^{m} k_i^{t-h+1} \]  

(126)

\[ j = 1, 2 \]

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i \left( \sum_{k=1}^{m} c_{i,j}^{t-h+1} + x_{i,j}^{t} \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i y_{i,j}^{t} \]  

(127)

\( h = 1, \ldots, m \)

\[ \frac{u_2(c_{1}^{t-h+1}, c_{2}^{t-h+1})}{u_1(c_{1}^{t-h+1}, c_{2}^{t-h+1})} = \frac{P_{2t}}{P_{1t}} \]  

(128)

\[ p_t c_{1}^{t-h+1} + p_{2t} c_{2}^{t-h+1} + x_{t+1}^{t-h+1} + b_{t+1}^{t-h+1} = w_t l_t^{h} + (1 + r_t^{h}) b_t^{t-h+1} + (1 + r_t^{i} - \delta) k_t^{t-h+1} \]  

(129)

\( h = 1, \ldots, m - 1 \)

\[ k_{t+1}^{t-h+1} (1 - \delta) k_t^{t-h+1} = x_t^{t-h+1} \]  

(130)

\[ \frac{\beta h u_1(c_{1}^{t-h+1}, c_{2}^{t-h+1})}{\beta h u_1(c_{1}^{t-h+1}, c_{2}^{t-h+1})} = (1 + r_t^{h}) \frac{P_{u}}{P_{1t+1}} \geq (1 + r_t^{h} - \delta) \frac{P_{u}}{P_{1t+1}}, \quad \text{if } x_t^{t-h+1} > 0 \]  

(131)

If there is international borrowing and lending,

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i \sum_{h=2}^{m} b_t^{t-h+1} = \left( \prod_{s=0}^{t} (1 + r_s^{h}) \right) \sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i \sum_{h=1-m}^{-1} \bar{b}_0^{ih} \]  

(132)

\[ r_t^{h} = r_t^{h} \]  

(133)

and the initial amount of fiat money is

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i \sum_{h=1-m}^{-1} \bar{b}_0^{ih}. \]

If there is no international borrowing and lending,

\[ \sum_{h=2}^{m} b_t^{t-h+1} = \left( \prod_{s=0}^{t} (1 + r_s^{h}) \right) \sum_{h=1-m}^{-1} \bar{b}_0^{ih} \]  

(134)

and the initial amount of fiat money per capita in country \( i \) is

\[ \sum_{h=1-m}^{-1} \bar{b}_0^{ih}. \]
Appendix 2: Proofs

Proof of proposition 1: The first-order conditions for the consumers’ problems, (9) or (18) and (19), imply the no-arbitrage condition \( r_t^L = r_t^H + \delta \) for all \( t > 0 \). Consequently, rental rates of capital are equalized for all \( t > 0 \). Since both goods are produced and each country produces at least one good, pick two countries, say 1 and 2, such that country 1 produces good 1 and country 2 produces good 2. Let \( p_j(r_t, w_t) \) be the unit cost function in sector \( j \). Since country 2 produces good 2, \( p_{2t} = p_2(r_t, w_t^2) \). Since \( \phi_2 \) is capital intensive, \( \phi_2 \) is strictly increasing in labor, which implies that \( p_2 \) is strictly increasing in the wage. This implies that \( w_t^1 \geq w_t^2 \).

There are two cases to examine. First, suppose that \( \phi_1 \) is also strictly increasing in labor. Then \( p_t = p_1(r_t, w_t^1) \leq p_1(r_t, w_t^2) \) where \( p_1 \) is strictly increasing in the wage. This implies that \( w_t^1 \leq w_t^2 \). Consequently, \( w_t^1 = w_t^2 \). Second, suppose instead that \( \phi_1 \) is not strictly increasing in labor. Then it cannot employ labor at a positive wage. Since \( w_t^1 \geq w_t^2 \), if \( w_t^1 > w_t^2 \), then \( w_t^1 > w_t^2 \) consequently, \( w_t^1 = w_t^2 \). Since \( \phi_2 \) is strictly increasing in labor, this implies that \( w_t^1 = w_t^2 \). ■

Proof of proposition 2: We prove the proposition for the model with infinitely lived consumers. The proposition for the model with overlapping generations follows the same argument with changes in notation. Assume that an equilibrium \( (p_{it}, p_{2t}, q_i^t, w_i^t, r_i^t), (c_{it}, c_{2t}, x_i^t, k_i^t, b_i^t), \)
\( (y_i^t, k_{jt}^t, \ell_{jt}^t), (x_i^t, x_{jt}^t, x_{zt}^t) \) exists in which \( x_i^t > 0 \) for all \( i \) and all \( t \). We provide a method for constructing an infinite number of equilibria that have the same values of all variables in all periods except for \( s \) and \( s+1 \). In periods \( s \) and \( s+1 \), we keep the values of prices \( p_{it}, p_{2t}, q_i^t = 1, w_i^t, r_i^t \), consumption \( c_{it}, c_{2t} \) in individual countries, and of aggregate production and investment fixed.

We change \( k_i^s \) to \( \tilde{k}_i^{s+1} \) so as to change the production plans \( y_{jt}^{s+1}, k_{jt}^{s+1}, \ell_{jt}^{s+1} \) to \( \tilde{y}_{jt}^{s+1}, \tilde{k}_{jt}^{s+1}, \tilde{\ell}_{jt}^{s+1} \), \( j=1,2 \). To accumulate the capital stock \( \tilde{k}_i^{s+1} \), we set \( \tilde{x}_i = \tilde{k}_i^{s+1} - (1-\delta)k_i^s \), \( \tilde{x}_{jt} = (\tilde{x}_i^j / x_i^j) x_{jt}^j \), \( j=1,2 \). To satisfy the budget constraint, we set \( \tilde{b}_{jt} = x_{jt}^j + b_{jt}^j - \tilde{x}_{jt}^j \). We then set \( \tilde{x}_{jt}^j = k_{jt}^{s+2} - (1-\delta)\tilde{k}_i^{s+2} \), \( \tilde{x}_{jt}^j = (\tilde{x}_{jt}^j / x_{jt}^j) x_{jt}^j \), \( j=1,2 \). It is easy to check that the budget constraint in country \( i \) period \( s+1 \) is satisfied because the constraint in \( s \) is satisfied.

To find nonnegative production plans \( \tilde{y}_{jt}^{s+1}, \tilde{k}_{jt}^{s+1}, \tilde{\ell}_{jt}^{s+1} \) consistent with profit maximization at the equilibrium prices \( p_{1t+1}, p_{2t+1}, w_{t+1}, r_{t+1} \), the capital-labor ratio \( \tilde{k}_{jt}^{s+1} \) needs to be in the cone of diversification,
\[
\kappa_1(p_{2t+1} / p_{1t+1}) \geq \tilde{k}_{jt}^{s+1} \geq \kappa_2(p_{2t+1} / p_{1t+1}).
\]
We also want to keep investment nonnegative in periods \( s \) and \( s+1 \),
\[
\tilde{k}_i^{s+1} \geq (1-\delta)k_i^s \quad \text{(136)}
\]
\[
\tilde{k}_i^{s+1} \geq k_i^{s+2} (1-\delta). \quad \text{(137)}
\]
Together, these inequalities become
\[
\min \left[ \kappa_1 \left( \frac{p_{2s+1}}{p_{1s+1}} \right), k^i_{s+1} \left( 1 - \delta \right) \right] \geq \tilde{k}^i_{s+1} \geq \max \left[ \kappa_2 \left( \frac{p_{2s+1}}{p_{1s+1}} \right), (1 - \delta)k^i_s \right].
\] (138)

Assumption A.2 ensures that the cone of diversification has an interior,
\[
\kappa_1 \left( \frac{p_{2s+1}}{p_{1s+1}} \right) > \kappa_2 \left( \frac{p_{2s+1}}{p_{1s+1}} \right).
\] (139)

Since we have assumed that \( x^i_t > 0 \) for \( t = s, s + 1 \),
\[
k^i_{s+2} \left( 1 - \delta \right) > k^i_{s+1} > (1 - \delta)k^i_s.
\] (140)

Proposition 1 ensures that \( k^i_{s+1} \) is in the cone of diversification, although it may be on the boundary. Therefore, \( k^i_{s+1} \) satisfies inequality (138) and
\[
\min \left[ \kappa_1 \left( \frac{p_{2s+1}}{p_{1s+1}} \right), k^i_{s+1} \left( 1 - \delta \right) \right] > \max \left[ \kappa_2 \left( \frac{p_{2s+1}}{p_{1s+1}} \right), (1 - \delta)k^i_s \right].
\] (141)

Consequently, we can set \( \tilde{k}^i_{s+1} = k^i_{s+1} + \epsilon^i \) for some nonzero \( \epsilon^i \) small enough and still satisfy inequality (138).

If \( k^i_{s+1} \left( 1 - \delta \right) > \kappa_1 \left( \frac{p_{2s+1}}{p_{1s+1}} \right) = k^i_{s+1} \), then we have to set \( \epsilon^i < 0 \), and, if \( (1 - \delta)k^i_s < \kappa_2 \left( \frac{p_{2s+1}}{p_{1s+1}} \right) = k^i_s \), then we have to set \( \epsilon^i > 0 \). Otherwise, we have freedom to set \( n - 1 \) values of \( \epsilon^i \) independently. We want to keep the aggregate capital stock the same,
\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\tilde{L}k^i_{s+1}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \tilde{L}} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{L \left( k^i_{s+1} + \epsilon^i \right)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} L} = k^i_{s+1},
\] (142)

which implies that
\[
\epsilon^n = -\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \left( L^i / L^n \right) \epsilon^i.
\] (143)

There are two possible cases. First, \( k^n_{s+1} \) is in the interior of the cone of diversification, in which case, by choosing \( \epsilon^i, i = 1, \ldots, n - 1 \), small enough, we can ensure that \( \tilde{k}^n_{s+1} = k^n_{s+1} - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \left( L^i / L^n \right) \epsilon^i \) stays in the cone. Second, \( k^n_{s+1} \) is on the boundary of the cone, in which case, if we can choose some of the deviations \( \epsilon^i, i = 1, \ldots, n - 1 \), to be positive and others negative, we can set them so that \( \epsilon^n \) has any desired sign. If all of the deviations \( \epsilon^i, i = 1, \ldots, n - 1 \), have to be of the same sign, then we know that all of the capital-labor ratios \( k^i_{s+1}, i = 1, \ldots, n - 1 \), are on the same boundary of the cone. Since \( k^i_{s+1} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{Lk^i_{s+1}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} L} \) is in the interior of the cone, however, this implies that \( k^n_{s+1} \), if it is on a boundary of the cone, is on the other boundary, which implies that \( \epsilon^n \) has the desired sign.

By reshuffling savings between capital and bonds, we have shown that there is an \( n - 1 \) dimensional indeterminacy in any period \( s + 1 \) for which \( x^i_s > 0 \) for all \( i \) in periods \( s \) and \( s + 1 \). If \( x^i_s = 0 \) in either of these periods for some country \( i \), then it could be that
\[
\min \left[ \kappa_1(p_{i+1} / p_{t+1}), k_{i+1} (1-\delta) \right] = \max \left[ \kappa_2(p_{i+1} / p_{t+1}), (1-\delta)k_s \right],
\]

which would imply that we have to set \( \varepsilon = 0 \) and would reduce the dimension of indeterminacy by 1 in period \( s+1 \). Notice that, if \( \delta = 1 \), then equation (144) can never hold, and we always have an \( n-1 \) dimensional indeterminacy in every period \( t > 0 \). ■

**Proof of lemma 1:** The result follows directly from the first-order conditions for the revenue maximization problem (31) and the strict concavity of \( \phi_j \). See, for example, Dixit and Norman (1980). ■

**Proof of lemma 2:** Suppose that the country social planner’s problem (35) is well posed in the sense that there is a feasible \( \{c^i_t, x^i_t, k^i_t\} \) such that \( \lim \inf_{T \to \infty} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t v(c^i_t) > -\infty \) and there is no feasible \( \{c^i_t, x^i_t, k^i_t\} \) such that \( \lim \sup_{T \to \infty} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t v(c^i_t) = +\infty \). We can show that the equilibrium \( \{c^i_t, x^i_t, k^i_t\} \) solves the country planner’s problem (35) in which the prices \( p^0 \) are the equilibrium prices and the initial capital stock is \( k^0_i \) by showing that the equilibrium conditions imply that the first-order conditions and transversality condition of (35) are satisfied. Furthermore, if \( V \) is well defined in the sense that \( -\infty < V(k; p^0) < +\infty \) for all \( k > 0 \), then it is straightforward to use the sorts of arguments in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) to show that the properties of \( v \) and \( \pi \) imply that \( V \) is continuous, increasing, and concave as a function of \( k \). Consequently, to prove the theorem we need to argue that \( -\infty < V(k; p^0) < +\infty \) for all \( k > 0 \). Notice that \( V(k^0_i; p^0) \) is finite when the prices \( p^0 \) are the equilibrium prices and the initial capital stock in country \( i \) is \( k^0_i \). Similarly, \( V(k^0_i; p^0) \) is finite for any \( k^0_i \) on the equilibrium path. Otherwise, the consumer’s problem (9) would not be well posed and the prices \( p^0 \) would not be the equilibrium prices.

We first argue that \( V(k; p^0) < +\infty \). Suppose, to the contrary, that \( V(k^0; p^0) = +\infty \) for some \( k^0 > 0 \), and let \( \{c^i_t, x^i_t, k^i_t\} \) be the corresponding plan for consumption, investment, and the capital stock. If \( k^0 \leq k^0_{\max} \), where \( k^0_{\max} > k^0_i \), \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), we could reduce \( k^0_{\max} \) to \( k^0_i \), follow the plan \( \{c^i_t, x^i_t, k^i_t\} \), and achieve infinite utility in equilibrium, which implies that the prices \( p^0 \) cannot be equilibrium prices. If \( k^0 > k^0_{\max} \), then assumption A.5 implies that we can reduce \( c^0_{\max} \) to \( \tilde{c}_0 \), \( c^0_{\max} > \tilde{c}_0 > 0 \), and increase \( x^0_{\max} \) to \( \tilde{x}_0 > x^0_{\max} \), thereby increasing \( k^0_{\max} \) to \( \tilde{k}_0 \). Consider the continuation plan

\[
(\tilde{c}_t, \tilde{x}_t, \tilde{k}_t) = (\theta \tilde{c}_t + (1-\theta)c^0_{\max}, \theta \tilde{x}_t + (1-\theta)x^0_{\max}, \theta \tilde{k}_t + (1-\theta)k^0_{\max}), \quad t = 1, 2, \ldots,
\]

where \( \theta = (\tilde{k}_t - k^0_t) / (\tilde{k}_t - k^0_{\max}) \). Since \( \{c^0_{\max}, x^0_{\max}, k^0_{\max}\} \) satisfies the feasibility conditions in problem (35) for the initial capital \( k^0_{\max} \) and \( \{\tilde{c}_t, \tilde{x}_t, \tilde{k}_t\} \) satisfies the feasibility for the initial capital \( \tilde{k}_0 \), \( \{\tilde{c}_t, \tilde{x}_t, \tilde{k}_t\} \) satisfies the feasibility conditions for initial capital \( k^0_{\max} \). Notice that, although \( v(\tilde{c}_0) < v(c^0_{\max}) \), the strict concavity of \( v \) implies that
\[
\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t v(\tilde{c}_t) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t v(\theta \tilde{c}_t + (1-\theta) v_i^c) > \theta \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t v(\tilde{c}_t^\max) + (1-\theta) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t v(c_i^\max) = +\infty,
\]
which again implies that the prices \( p^0 \) cannot be equilibrium prices.

We now argue that \( V(k; p^0) > -\infty \). Suppose, to the contrary, that \( V(\tilde{k}_0; p^0) = -\infty \) for some \( \tilde{k}_0 > 0 \). If \( \tilde{k}_0 \geq \tilde{k}_i^{\max} \), where \( \tilde{k}_i^{\max} \leq \tilde{k}_i \), \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), we could reduce \( \tilde{k}_0 \) to \( k_i^{\max} \), follow the equilibrium plan \( \{ c_i^{\max}, x_i^{\max}, k_i^{\max} \} \) and achieve a finite value of the objective function in problem (35), which implies that \( V(\tilde{k}_0; p^0) > -\infty \). If \( \tilde{k}_0 < \tilde{k}_i^{\max} \), consider the plan \( \{ \theta c_i^{\max}, \theta x_i^{\max}, \theta k_i^{\max} \} \), where \( \theta = \tilde{k}_0 / \tilde{k}_i^{\max} \). Since \( \{ c_i^{\max}, x_i^{\max}, k_i^{\max} \} \) is feasible for initial capital \( k_i^{\max} \), \( \{ \theta c_i^{\max}, \theta x_i^{\max}, \theta k_i^{\max} \} \) is feasible for initial capital \( \tilde{k}_0 \) and

\[
V(\tilde{k}_0; p^0) \geq \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t v(\theta c_i^{\max}) \geq \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t v(c_i^{\max}) - (1-\theta) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t v(c_i^{\max})c_i^{\max}.
\]

The strict concavity of \( v \) implies that

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t v(c_i^{\max})c_i^{\max} = \frac{v(c_i^{\max})}{p(p_{10}, p_{20})} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \left( \prod_{s=1}^{\tau} \frac{1}{1+p_s^{\max}} \right) p(p_{1s}, p_{2s})c_i^{\max} < +\infty.
\]

(In fact, the latter term is the present discounted value in period 0 of consumption in \( i_{\min} \).)

Consequently, \( V(\tilde{k}_0; p^0) > -\infty \). ■

Proof of proposition 3. The proof follows the approach of Milgrom and Shannon (1994). We prove that \( k_0^1 \geq k_0^0 \) implies \( k_i^1 \geq k_i^0 \). By induction, the argument extends to any other period. Let us write the country social planner’s problem as

\[
V(k; p^0) = \max v(c_0(k_i^0, k_i^1; p^0)) + \beta V(k_i^1; p^1)
\]

s.t. \( 0 \leq k_i^0 \leq \tilde{k}(k_i^0; p^0) \)

where \( c_0(k_i^0, k_i^1; p^0) = (\pi(p_{10}, p_{20}, k_i^0) - k_i^0 + (1-\delta)k_i^0) / p(p_{10}, p_{20}) \), and

\( \tilde{k}(k_i^0; p^0) = \pi(p_{10}, p_{20}) + (1-\delta)k_i^0 \). Define \( F(k_i^0, k_i^1; p^0) = v(c_0(k_i^0, k_i^1; p^0)) + \beta V(k_i^1; p^1) \). We prove our result by contradiction. If \( k_i^0 = k_i^1 \), then \( k_i^1 = k_i^0 \). Therefore, assume, without loss of generality, that \( k_i^0 > k_i^2 \) and \( k_i^1 < k_i^2 \). Notice that, since \( k_i^1 < k_i^2 \leq \tilde{k}(k_i^0; p^0) < \tilde{k}(k_i^1; p^0) \), both \( k_i^1 \) and \( k_i^2 \) are feasible. Since \( k_i^1 \) maximizes \( F(k_i^0, k_i^1; p^0) \), \( i = 1, 2 \), we know that

\[
F(k_i^{1, 1}, k_i^1; p^0) - F(k_i^{1, 2}, k_i^1; p^0) \geq 0 \geq F(k_i^0, k_i^1; p^0) - F(k_i^0, k_i^2; p^0)
\]

Define the function \( g(k_i) = F(k_i^0, k_i^1; p^0) - F(k_i^0, k_i^2; p^0) \).
where \( \pi_k(p_{10}, p_{20}, k_0) \) is the partial derivative of \( \pi(p_{10}, p_{20}, k_0) \) with respect to \( k_0 \). The inequality follows from the fact that \( v \) is strictly concave and \( c_0 \) is strictly increasing in \( k_1 \). Therefore, \( k_0^1 > k_0^2 \) implies \( g(k_0^1) < g(k_0^2) \), which contradicts (151).

Suppose now that \( k_0^1 > k_0^2 \). We have demonstrated that \( k_1^1 \geq k_1^2 \). We now demonstrate that, if \( x_0^1 > 0 \), \( k_1^1 > k_1^2 \). Suppose, to the contrary, that \( k_1^1 > k_1^2 \) and \( x_0^1 > 0 \), but that \( k_1^1 = k_1^2 \). Since \( k_1^1 > k_1^2 \) and \( x_0^1 > 0 \) imply that \( x_0^2 > x_0^1 > 0 \). We can therefore write the first-order condition for \( x_0^i \) in (35) as an equality,

\[
\frac{v(c_0^i)}{p(p_{10}, p_{20})} = \frac{\beta v(c_0^i)}{p(p_{11}, p_{21})} \left( \pi_k(p_{11}, p_{21}, k_1^i) + 1 - \delta \right), \quad i = 1, 2. \tag{154}
\]

Since \( k_1^1 = k_1^2 \), \( c_1^1 = c_1^2 \). Equation (154) therefore implies that

\[
v(c_0^1) = v(c_0^2). \tag{155}
\]

Since \( c_0^1 > c_0^2 \) and \( v \) is strictly concave, however,

\[
v(c_0^1) < v(c_0^2), \tag{156}
\]

a contradiction. ■

**Proof of proposition 4:** Without loss of generality, assume that \( \hat{k}_1^i > 0 \). The first-order condition for the consumer’s problem (9) implies that

\[
\frac{1}{\beta} \leq 1 + \delta \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1}{\beta} = \text{if } \hat{x}_i^i > 0. \tag{157}
\]

Therefore, for all \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) such that \( \hat{x}_i^i > 0 \), \( \hat{\rho}^i = \hat{\rho}^1 \). Assume that there is a country \( i \) for which \( \hat{x}_i^i = 0 \) and \( \hat{\rho}^i < \hat{\rho}^1 \). Since the rental rate of capital is lower in country \( i \), lemma 1 implies that \( \hat{k}_i^i > \hat{k}_1^i \). Consequently, \( \hat{\rho}^i = \hat{\rho}^1 \) for all \( i = 1, \ldots, n \). Following the same argument as in the proof of proposition 1, equal rental rates of capital across countries imply equal wages across countries. ■

**Proof of proposition 5:** Suppose that the economy has a nontrivial steady state with distribution of capital \( \hat{k}_1^i, \ldots, \hat{k}_n^i \). We argue that there exists a nontrivial steady state for all \( (k_1^i, \ldots, k_n^i) \) that satisfy

\[
\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{\ell}^i k_i = \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{\ell}^i \hat{k}_i \tag{158}
\]

\[
\hat{k}_2 \leq k_i^i \leq \hat{k}_1^i, \tag{159}
\]
where \( \hat{\kappa}_j \) is the capital-labor ratio in industry \( j, j = 1, 2 \). Each of these steady states has the same prices and, by construction, the same aggregate capital and production. We need to define the other steady state variables and show that these steady state variables satisfy the equilibrium conditions listed in appendix 1. Let the distribution of capital and labor across industries in each country be

\[
\ell_1^i = \frac{k_1^i - \hat{\kappa}_2}{\hat{\kappa}_1 - \hat{\kappa}_2}, \quad \ell_2^i = 1 - \ell_1^i
\]

(160)

\[
k_j^i = \hat{\kappa}_j \ell_j^i.
\]

(161)

Since \( k^i > 0 \), we can use the first-order conditions for the investment good (115) to set

\[
x_2^i = \frac{\delta k^i}{f(\hat{x}_1^i / \hat{x}_2^i, 1)}
\]

(162)

\[
x_1^i = (\hat{x}_1^i / \hat{x}_2^i)x_2^i.
\]

(163)

We also set \( \hat{b} = 0 \). It is easy to check that all of the production feasibility conditions (108)–(116) are satisfied in the new steady state. We are left with defining consumption patterns that are consistent with the consumer’s first-order conditions and the feasibility conditions in each goods market. Equation (117) and assumption A.5 imply that \( \hat{c}_i^2 / \hat{c}_2^2 = \hat{c}_i / \hat{c}_2^2 \). We use the budget constraint (119) to define

\[
c_2^i = \frac{\hat{w} + (\hat{r} - \delta)k^i}{\hat{p}_1 \hat{c}_1 / \hat{c}_2^2 + \hat{p}_2}
\]

(164)

\[
c_1^i = (\hat{c}_1 / \hat{c}_2^2)c_2^i.
\]

(165)

With these definitions the rest of the conditions that characterize equilibrium, conditions (118)–(120) are satisfied. Condition (123) is satisfied by construction.

**Proof of proposition 6:** There are three steps in the argument. First, we show that, if \( \gamma^i > 1 \) for some \( i \) then \( \gamma^i > 1 \) for all \( i \). Second, we show that, if \( \gamma^i > 1 \) for all \( i \), then \( \gamma^i = \gamma \) for all \( i \). Third and finally, we use \( \gamma^i = \gamma \) for all \( i \) to prove that factor prices are equal in the limit.

To prove that \( \gamma^i > 1 \) for some \( i \) implies that \( \gamma^i > 1 \) for all \( i \), assume, to the contrary and without loss of generality, that \( 0 < \gamma^2 < 1 < \gamma^1 \). Notice that \( \gamma^1 > 1 \) implies that there exists \( T^1 \) such that \( c^1_t > c^1_{t+1} \) for all \( t = T^1, T^1 + 1, \ldots \). The strict concavity of utility implies that \( v'(c_t^1) > v'(c^1_{t+1}) \) for all \( t = T^1, T^1 + 1, \ldots \). Similarly, there exists \( T^2 \) such that \( c^2_t > c^2_{t+1} \) and \( v'(c_t^2) < v'(c^2_{t+1}) \) for all \( t = T^2, T^2 + 1, \ldots \). Consequently, for all \( t = T, T + 1, \ldots \), where \( T > \max[T^1, T^2] \),

\[
\frac{v'(c^2_t)}{v'(c^2_{t+1})} < 1 < \frac{v'(c^1_t)}{v'(c^1_{t+1})}.
\]

(166)

Notice too that there exists \( T^3 \) such that \( k^i_{T^3} > k^i_1 > k^i_t \) for all \( t = T^3, T^3 + 1, \ldots \). Consequently, we can use the consumers’ first-order conditions (118) to obtain
which implies that
\[ r^{1}_{t+1} > r^{2}_{t+1}. \] (168)

Lemma 1 says that \( k^{1}_{t+1} > k^{2}_{t+1} \) and \( r^{1}_{t+1} > r^{2}_{t+1} \) is not possible in equilibrium, however, which is the desired contradiction.

To prove that \( \gamma' > 1 \) for all \( i \) implies that \( \gamma' = \gamma \) for all \( i \), assume, to the contrary and without loss of generality, that \( \gamma^1 > \gamma^2 > 1 \). Consider the function
\[ h(\gamma') = \lim_{c \to \infty} \frac{v'(c)}{v(\gamma' c)}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n. \] (169)

The strict concavity of \( v \) implies that \( h'(\gamma') > 0 \), which implies that \( h(\gamma^1) > h(\gamma^2) \). Since \( \lim_{t \to \infty} c^t_i / \gamma_i = \gamma^1 > 1 \) and \( v' \) is continuous, there exists \( T \) such that
\[ \frac{v'(c^t_i)}{v(c^t_{i+1})} > \frac{v'(c^{t+1}_i)}{v(c^{t+1}_{i+1})} \] (170)
for all \( t = T, T + 1, \ldots \). Consequently, following the same logic as in the argument that \( \gamma' > 1 \) for some \( i \) implies that \( \gamma' > 1 \) for all \( i \), we can show that \( k^1_i > k^2_i \) and \( r^1_i > r^2_i \), which lemma 1 says is not possible in equilibrium and which is the desired contradiction.

Since \( \gamma' = \gamma \) for all \( i \), we know that
\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} (1 + r^i_t - \delta) \frac{p(p_{1t}, p_{2t})}{p(p_{1t+1}, p_{2t+1})} = h(\gamma), \] (171)
which implies that
\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} r^i_t = r \] (172)
for all \( i \). The rest of the proof is a modification of the proofs of propositions 4 and 5. ■

**Proof of proposition 7:** Assume that the model has a cycle of periodicity \( s \). Since \( \hat{x}^j_i > 0 \), the first-order conditions for the consumer’s problem (9) are satisfied with equality. Multiplying these conditions for \( t = 1, \ldots, s + 1 \) and using the fact that \( c^j_{ji} = c^j_{j+1}, \quad j = 1, 2 \), and \( p_{1i} = p_{1i-1} \), we obtain
\[ \beta^s \prod_{t=1}^{s+1} (1 - \delta + r^i_t) = 1. \] (173)
Assume that there is a period in which rental rates are not equal in two countries, that is, without loss of generality, assume that \( r^i_t < r^i_t \) for some \( t, \quad t = 1, \ldots, s \). Equation (173) implies that there exists \( t' = 1, \ldots, s + 1 \) such \( r^i_{t'} > r^i_{t'} \). Lemma 1 implies that \( k^1_i > k^2_i \) and \( k^1_i < k^2_i \), which contradicts proposition 3. ■
Proof of proposition 8: Assume, to the contrary, that an equilibrium cycle exists. Proposition 7 says that factor prices are equalized along the equilibrium path. Therefore, since \( x'_i > 0 \) for all \( i \) and \( t \), there exists an equilibrium cycle for the integrated economy. Since the model is one-sector aggregatable, the equilibrium of the integrated economy solves the one-sector social planner’s problem

\[
\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t v(c_t)
\]

s.t. \( c_t + x_t \leq F(k_t, 1) \)
\[
k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t \leq x_t
\]
\[
c_i \geq 0, \ x_i \geq 0
\]
\[
k_0 \leq \bar{k}_0.
\]

Here \( F \) is the production function

\[
F(k, \ell) = \max f(y_1, y_2)
\]

s.t. \( y_j = \phi_j(k_j, \ell_j), \ j = 1, 2 \)
\[
k_i + k_2 \leq k
\]
\[
\ell_i + \ell_2 \leq \ell
\]
\[
k_j \geq 0, \ \ell_j \geq 0.
\]

See Bajona and Kehoe (2006) for details. Standard results from, for example, Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) imply that the aggregate \( k_t \) is either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing (or constant). Suppose, for example, that \( \bar{k}_0 < \hat{k} \). Then proposition 3 implies that, since \( k_t \) is strictly increasing, then so are all \( k_t, i = 1, ..., n \), which implies that there are no cycles.

Proof of proposition 9: Assumption A.5’ implies that, for given prices, the solution to the consumer’s maximization problem (18) is unique. In a steady state with factor price equalization, each generation in every country faces the same prices and, therefore, chooses the same consumption and saving plans. To see that the steady state is interior to the cone of diversification, observe that, since \( \delta > 0 \), there is positive investment in every state and, consequently, assumption A.3 implies that a positive amount of both goods is produced in every country.

Proof of proposition 10: Proposition 9 implies that, in a steady state, all countries produce positive amounts of each good, \( j = 1, 2 \). Assumption A.1 implies that the functions \( \kappa_j, j = 1, 2 \), that determine the cone of diversification are continuous functions of prices. Therefore, there exists a period \( T \) such that for all \( t = T, T+1, ... \) the equilibrium is inside the cone of diversification and factor prices are equalized. Furthermore, all generations born after period \( t = T + m \) face the same prices. The same argument as the one used in proposition 9 assures that these generations choose the same consumption and saving patterns, making the equilibrium autarkic.

Proof of proposition 11: See the proof of theorem 1 in Fisher (1992).
References


Figure 1. Lerner diagram

\[ p_1 \phi_1(k, \ell) = 1 \]

\[ p_2 \phi_2(k, \ell) = 1 \]

\[ rk + w\ell = 1 \]

Figure 2. Revenue function

\[ \pi(p_1, p_2, k) \]

\[ p_1 \phi_1(k, 1) \]

\[ p_2 \phi_2(k, 1) \]
Figure 3. Steady state and cone of diversification in example 4

$\hat{\kappa}_1(1) = 1.3830$

$(1, \hat{k}^1) = (1, 1.4219)$

$\hat{\kappa}_2(1) = 1.0757$

$(1, \hat{k}^2) = (1, 1)$

Figure 4. Steady state and cone of diversification in example 5

$\hat{\kappa}_1(1) = 1.6944$

$(1, \hat{k}^1) = (1, 1.4507)$

$\hat{\kappa}_2(1) = 1.3179$

$(1, \hat{k}^2) = (1, 1)$
Figure 5. Cycle in the pure exchange economy in example 8

\[ z^{t-1} + y' = 0 \]

\((y', z')\)